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COMPULSORY JOINDER: The Real Thing Down In Louisiana
Introduction
Compulsory joinder defines the parameters wherein a litigant's
right to select his adversary is limited by the need to join certain
persons for complete adjudication of a claim. Two fundamental prin-
ciples lie at the core of rules mandating the joinder of parties in a
given suit. The first of these principles is a basic doctrine of due
process: A court will not adjudicate the rights of a person not before
the tribunal;' the second is that a court avoids rendering in-
conclusive judgments.'
Joinder rules designed to implement these principles have been
traced to the nineteenth century merger of law and equity; the mer-
ger impressed upon common law suits, which traditionally favored
narrow rulings on the rights of the immediate parties, the more ex-
pansive joinder practices of the equity courts.' The proliferation of
1. The principles which led to the development of rules on mandatory joinder
were isolated and explored extensively in Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in
Civil Actions, 55 MICH. L. REv. 327(1957). This classic study identifies the origin of
joinder rules in the merger of law and equity and calls for a pragmatic approach to
joinder. Professor Reed's account of the basic principles joinder serves is adopted in
Hazard, Indispensable Party: The Historical Origin of a Procedural Phantom, 61 Cot-
UM. L. REV. 1254. 1287 (1961); Lewis, Mandatory Joinder of Parties in Civil Pro-
ceedings: The Case for Analytical Pragmatism. 26 U. FLA. L, REV. 381, 882 (1974).
2. Reed, supra note 1, at 332, 334; Lewis, supra note 1, at 385. This principle also
gives rise to judicial distaste for piecemeal litigation, which overburdens courts, delays
a final resolution of issues, and increases the cost of adjudication. The rule favoring
dispositive judgments, according to Professor Reed, reflects that "[tihe public interest
in a smoothly functioning judiciary overbears the individual's desire to impose on the
court's time to secure a moot decision or to have two determinations where one would
suffice." 55 MICH. L. REV. at 334.
3. At law, the practice was to consider a single disputed issue, and thus was re-
quired the presence of only the persons "directly and immediately interested in
the subject matter of the suit, and whose interests are of a strictly legal nature."
The presence of persons possessing mere equitable or "similarly remote" interests
was not only not required but was not even permitted. Naturally, only those pre-
sent were bound by the court's decision. In equity . .. a decree was sought, and
not a decision merely. Accordingly, it was necessary to bring before the court all
persons whose interests might be affected by the proposed decree, or whose con-
currence was necessary to an effective and meaningful determination of the con-
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rules on joinder may have obscured, but has not invalidated, its
basic principles, which favor affording all affected persons a day in
court, but discourage needless or inconclusive litigation. The pur-
pose of compulsory joinder is to effectuate-and in individual cases,
to reconcile-two equally significant procedural goals; balancing in-
terests lies at the core of the concept of joinder.
Principles, when applied to specific cases, inevitably splinter into
rules, and joinder was no exception.' When enough rules clutter the
landscape to conceal the concepts justifying rules, a restatement of
principles, reflecting current developments, is in order. The classic
reformulation defining mandatory joinder in nineteenth century
American jurisprudence was Shields v. Barrow,' in which the United
States Supreme Court rearticulated joinder principles but phrased
them in terms of "necessary" and "indispensable" parties The prob-
lem with the Shields v. Barrow formulation was that it encouraged a
jurisprudence of labels in which evaluation of the interests and cir-
cumstances of individual persons in particular suits was subor-
dinated to a fixed and rigid classification yielding "automatic"
results.! Whether labels actually have determined results in joinder
troversy. Each person having a legal or equitable interest in the subject matter of
the suit was required to be a party to the action.
Reed, supra note 1, at 330-31. The development of pleading rules on joinder through
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is treated in Hazard, supra note 1.
4. Reed, supra note 1, at 347, cites English decisions rendered in 1682 and 1751
as stressing "the impropriety of a procedure which would leave defendant open to two
or more lawsuits for the same alleged wrong."
5. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130 (1855).
6. Persons having an interest in the controversy, and who ought to be made par-
ties, in order that the court may act on that rule which requires it to decide on,
and finally determine the entire controversy, and do complete justice, by ad-
justing all the rights involved in it. These persons are commonly termed
necessary parties; but if their interests are separable from those of the parties
before the court, so that the court can proceed to a decree, and do complete and
final justice, without affecting other persons not before the court, Itheyl are not
indispensable parties.
Id at 139. Indispensable parties are defined as:
Persons who not only have an interest in the controversy, but an interest of such
a nature that a final decree cannot be made without either affecting that interest,
or'leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final termination may be
wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience.
Id
7. Reed, supra note 1, at 351-56; Lewis, supra note 1, at 386. The problem of
resolving joinder questions by reference to fixed categories, as opposed to careful
analysis of specific cases, was intensified by the importance courts attached to the non-
joinder of an indispensable party. The rule that a court could notice on its own motion
the absence of an indispensable party was translated into a "jurisdictional" theory: If
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cases" is debatable;' but even when courts use labels as shorthand
for a thorough analysis of particular cases, the labels hide the fac-
tors which should be stated openly, both as a matter of judicial ac-
countability and as a means of providing guidance. Proper use of
joinder to facilitate efficient and fair litigation demands that both
bar and bench squarely address the basic concerns of compulsory
joinder:
(1) the unfairness to those present of proceeding without an
absent party; (2) the effect on the absentees of a determination
of the controversy before the court; and (3) the court's ability to
determine finally the rights of the parties before it in a manner
which cannot be aborted by action of an absent party.10
The problem compulsory joinder addresses in any given case is
whether the initial grouping of parties is to yield in favor of any-or
a mixture-of these interests." The interests shift in the context of
particular cases, and a neat "list" of relevant interests may be as
an indispensable absentee could not be brought before the forum, the court lacked
"jurisdiction" over the action. The theory, fortunately discredited, was not merely in-
accurate, but as commentators have pointed out, prevented courts from fashioning
alternatives to joining needed parties. The jurisdictional theory is mentioned by
Hazard, supra note 1, at 1254-55, and discussed in more detail by Lewis. supra note 1,
323-24.
8. This is the position taken by Professor Reed, who notes the influence of the
Shields i. Barrow classification on American joinder cases:
It is not simply that labels have determined the outcome of many cases. The trou-
ble rather is the result of several factors operating concurrently: a ready reliance
on labels for solutions of particular cases, a thoughtless reiteration -instead of a
critical reexamination-of the basic principles of required joinder, and a concep-
tualistic view of "jurisdiction" and "rights" in relation to the joinder of parties.
Reed, supra note 1, at 328-29.
9. Eagleton. Proposed "Parties" and "Joinder" Sections for Federal Pleading
Rules, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 597, 597-602 (1936), suggests that imprecision in terminology
applied to joinder and parties, rather than a faulty decisional process, is the source of
confusion about joinder.
10. Comment, Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. REv. 874.
880 (1958).
Professor Reed's formulation of the three relevant interests is slightly different,
focusing upon the interests of defendants, as opposed to the interests of all present
parties, in the first grouping of interests. He argues that there is no reason to compel
a plaintiff to litigate with a party "not of his own choosing" in order to protect the
plaintiffs interests. Reed, supra note 1, at 330.
The broader formulation is used here because protection of the plaintiff's interest
is a factor courts consider and because the protection afforded a plaintiff, if properly
weighed against other interests in a given case, inures to the benefit of the system of
justice as a whole.
11. Reed, supra note 1, at 330.
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dangerous as labels in substituting abstraction for the concrete prac-
tical issues joinder involves: harassment of a defendant with multi-
ple litigation, adverse practical consequences to absentees, addi-
tional delay and expense in obtaining a remedy, and convenience to
a court."2 Not every relevant consideration is present in every case,
and a basic task of the court is to isolate which interests are at play
in a given action and then to evaluate them with due consideration
of the kind and scope of relief sought. Also, the interests which are
relevant at the trial level-are altered by the time a case reaches an
appellate court.
For instance, a plaintiff successful in the trial court now has an
interest in preserving his judgment;"8 the judicial resources already
expended become significant," particularly if joinder would have
served judicial economy at the trial level but would require relitiga-
tion on remand; 5 if joinder is intended to protect the defendant, and
he failed to raise an objection to nonjoinder before trial, his interest
should be given less weight than if joinder is needed to protect the
absentee.' And, since dismissal of an action for nonjoinder of a com-
pulsory party places the burden of joinder solely upon the plaintiff,
any relevant relationship either plaintiff or defendant might have
with the absentee should be scrutinized carefully, especially if
joinder is to protect the defendant's interests. 7 Careful attention to
the facts of each case, including the object of the suit and the rela-
tionships of the parties, is essential if compulsory joinder is to ac-
complish the fairness and efficiency the device is intended to effect.
The virtue of the revised version of Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is that the rule details the factors a court should
consider pragmatically when deciding whether a party should or
must be joined. 8
The goals of Louisiana's joinder rules" do not differ from those
12. Id. at 356.
13. Lewis, supra note 1, at 394.
14. Id. at 410.
15. Eagleton, supra note 9, at 622.
16. Id
17. Comment, supra note 10, at 882.
18. The criteria outlined in Rule 19 appear in notes 146 and 147, infra.
It has been suggested that Federal Rule 19 emphasizes fairness and that "[cdon-
siderations of economy and convenience are important and interrelated, but
secondary." Lewis. supra note 1, at 388.
The classic example of application of the Rule 19 criteria is Provident Tradesmens
Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 (1968).
19. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 641-47 are the core of Louisiana's joinder procedure;
however, compulsory joinder also is mandated by specific articles; arts. 697 and 698
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of any other procedural system." The claim that common law joinder
principles were inapplicable to Louisiana" had some justification
when the joinder principles of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and those of other states followed the Shields v. Barrow test, keyed
to whether the absentee's interest was severable from the subject
matter of the litigation and focused on the joint and joint and sever-
al obligation. Since a "joint obligation" in Louisiana involves only
virile share liability, and since solidary obligors need not be joined
by an obligee," the discussions of joint interests which pepper
liberally treatments of common law joinder" are inapposite here.
But if "[t]he rules of compulsory joinder in Louisiana . . . rest upon
purely procedural bases,"'" procedural considerations also dictate
the criteria of Federal Rule 19 as amended; the practical effect of
the difference between Louisiana's obligations law and common law
categories is evident only in considering the object of a suit, a factor
which varies in each case under any procedural system. Since the
1966 amendments of the Federal Rules to incorporate explicitly func-
tional criteria, Louisiana's joinder rules seem both abstract and
restrictive by comparison," and it has been suggested that the ef-
forts of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure joinder articles to
regulate joinder by the antiquated labels largely abandoned by the
Federal Rules "have on the whole probably produced more litigation
(governing subrogation and assignment); art. 1092 (governing intervention); and art.
1113 (governing the third party demand).
20. McMahon, The Joinder of Parties in Louisiana, 19 LA. L. REV. 1 (1958).
21. Id. at 9-11. This argument assumes, of course, that the Shields v. Barrow
labels were in fact determinative of joinder issues and were not a mere shorthand or
"smokescreen" for more careful pragmatic scrutiny.
22. Id at 11.
23. See, e.g., Reed, supra note 1, at 356-58, 372-73; Lewis, supra note 1, at 400-09;
Comment, The Litigant and the Absentee in Federal Multiparty Practice, 116 U. PA.
L. REV. 531, 536 (1968); Note, Indispensable Parties Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 56 YALE L. REv. 1088, 1088-93 (1947).
24. McMahon, supra note 20, at 11.
25. Just as the Louisiana compulsory joinder articles do now, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 19, when originally promulgated in 1937, attempted to regulate joinder
on the basis of abstract concepts, not of functional considerations .... Because of
the confusing and impractical judicial applications, the rule was revised in 1966 to
require joinder or not on the basis of the true policy considerations, sometimes
conflicting, such as the practical impairment of the protection of an absentee's in-
terest, substantial risk to any of the parties of incurring multiple or otherwise in-
consistent obligations, or the adequacy of the relief possible without the joinder.
Similar revision of the Louisiana articles on the subject seems indicated by the
growing confusion in their judicial applications.
Tate, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts of the 1968-1969 Term- Civil Pro-
cedure, 30 LA. L. REv. 286, 291 (1969).
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and more confusion on the issue than existed prior to the 1960 at-
tempt to clarify the question. 28 Certainly, any attempt to analyze
Louisiana's jurisprudence on compulsory joinder in light of the Code
of Civil Procedure's scattered joinder provisions 7 should avoid an
isolationist stance. The concerns of joinder in Louisiana are identical
to joinder interests in other procedural systems-and are ultimately
reducible to fairness to all concerned persons and to efficiency in the
allocation of judicial resources.
Moreover, Louisiana's joinder decisions and their accompanying
rationales must be approached with the recognition that compulsory
joinder is but one of several alternatives available to courts in
meeting the goals of fairness and efficiency. When these objectives
are presented in the context of adding parties to litigation, two
basic alternatives should be considered before an action is dismissed
or a judgment disturbed for lack of a needed litigant. The first alter-
native is suggested in Federal Rule 19(b): the court may be able to
condition its judgment or to fashion relief narrowly so that the
absentee is protected without leaving the present parties without a
judgment to fix their relative rights." The other alternative forms
the premise of FederalRule 19(a): in many cases when joinder is not
feasible, a full and final adjudication determining the rights of all in-
terested persons is not essential; a partial judgment, or even several
suits relitigating issues previously decided, may be preferable to de-
nying all relief. "The mere fact that a second action may be required
to determine the totality of the issues involved in a controversy is
not a bar to the maintenance of the incomplete first action."29
Courts exist to settle disputes, as a civilized alternative to "self
help." Given that truism, little justification exists for dismissing a
legitimate claim or even for remanding a decision for certain reliti-
gation when the possibility of future actions is speculative or remote.
As important as the avoidance of multiple litigation and adverse ef-
fect on an absentee are, cases involving joinder always present mul-
tiple interests; and any joinder test which stresses one or two
favored interests at the expense of others will lead inevitably to un-
fair results in those cases in which facts shift the equities to favor
an interest an inflexible formula may overlook.
26. Id. at 289.
27. See note 19, supra.
28. Reed, supra note 1, at 354; Note, supra note 23, at 1091.
29. Reed, supra note 1, at 335. See Lewis, supra note 1, at 387-88.
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Early Louisiana Jurisprudence: Roots
A sampling of Louisiana jurisprudence on compulsory joinder
before the adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure indicates that
Louisiana courts originally employed a balancing test to determine
when a party's presence was essential to the litigation of a claim.
The terms "indispensable" and "necessary" were used inter-
changeably in the early cases, but the functional impact of finding a
party essential to an action was settled: The absence of an essential
party was an objection which could not be waived.' Aside from cases
isolating specific relationships deemed crucial to represent certain
interests,' Louisiana appellate courts were hesitant to label persons
as "indispensable" or "necessary" when to do so would set aside a
judgment previously rendered. The majority of the cases sampled
treat interests in real property, 2 but the courts in various cases con-
sidered a number of factors in deciding whether an absentee's joinder
was essential to adjudication of a given dispute.
The courts' reluctance to affect adversely the rights of absen-
tees in immovable property or property-related interests was the
determinative factor in several cases. In Ashbey v. Ashbey" the
plaintiff individually and as tutor for his minor children sued to set
aside mortgages favoring the minors. The Louisiana Supreme Court,
noting that the plaintiff-father's interests were adverse to those of
his children," found the father "incompetent" to represent their in-
terests." The young mortgagees, then, were in effect unrepresented,
and the supreme court upheld the trial court's refusal to order the
sheriff to cancel the mortgages on the grounds that the mortgagees
30. Ashbey v. Ashbey, 41 La. Ann. 138, 141, 5 So. 546, 547 (1889) and citations
therein.
31. Early Louisiana jurisprudence recognized relational interests keyed to the
procedural capacity of particular persons or entities to be sued and thus evolved a set
of rules requiring, for instance, that a minor be represented by his tutor; Bee, e.g.,
Ashbey v. Ashbey, supra note 30; or that a partnership be sued in its own name; Bee,
e.g., Key v. Boz, 14 La. Ann. 497 (1859). Later codified as rules on parties defendant,
these cases create functionally a form of compulsory joinder and are discussed in the
text at notes 262-65, infra.
32. One commentator noted that "[controversies involving multiple interests in
real property present courts with more problems of mandatory joinder than any other
single class of cases." Lewis, supra note 1, at 346.
33. 41 La. Ann. 138, 5 So. 546 (1889).
34. The court noted that the father sought to cancel a mortgage in the children's
favor and to declare them one-half owners of valuable real estate which the record in-
dicated that the minors wholly owned. 41 La. Ann. at 142, 5 So. at 647.
35. 1&
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would be so directly affected by the erasure that they were "neces-
sary parties" to an action ordering cancellation of their mortgages
from the public records. In considering the impact upon the unrepre-
sented minors, the Ashbey court turned to Gasquet v. Dimitry,"
which pointed out that an order to cancel a mortgage does not
"bind" nonparties but is likely to work practical hardships on both
the mortgagees and later purchasers of the property." Another "ab-
sentee" whose interests were at least mentioned by the Ashbey
court was the recorder of mortgages; the court noted that "to order
the recorder of mortgages to proceed to the cancellation, in the
absence of such necessary parties . . .would be equivalent to an
order to that officer to perform the duty at his peril."38 Thus, the in-
terests of the absentees outweighed the plaintiff's interest in protect-
ing a judgment obtained in violation of his duties to the minors, and
the court found the absence of the necessary parties to invalidate
the judgment. 9
The court's focus in Ashbey upon the interests of the absentees
was reiterated in Sanders v. Flowers," a slander of title action
which on original hearing dismissed the plaintiff's suit because he
did not join the Commissioner of Conservation to an action attacking
one of his orders." On rehearing, the supreme court decided that the
Commissioner was not a "necessary party." The Sanders decision is
illuminating both for its definition of the "test" for determining
whether a party is a "necessary" defendant and for its pragmatic
36. 6 La. 453 (1834).
37. The Gasquet court speculated that
"(alithough those mortgagees are not parties to the rule, its being made absolute
may do them great injury. They may not be bound by it, but the sheriff may
release, and the recorder of mortgages, on the production of the release, may pro-
ceed to the radiation of these mortgages, and the radiation may occasion trouble
and injury to these mortgagees and subsequent purchasers."
Id. at 454-55.
38. 41 La. Ann. at 141, 5 So. at 547. Because neither the recorder nor the mort-
gagees would be "bound" by the order, nothing would prevent the mortgagees from at-
tacking the cancellation, presumably by suing the recorder.
39. 41 La. at 142, 5 So. at 547-48. A similar set of facts was presented in Succes-
sion of Todd, 165 La. 453, 115 So. 653 (1928); the mother and tutrix of minor children
also had served as executrix of the succession of their father and, in her dual capacity,
had sold succession immovables to pay alleged succession debts. In a subsequent action
to rescind the probate sale and to recover the property, the court cited Ashbey as
grounds for refusing to rule on the appealed exceptions of prescription and no cause of
action and for instead noticing sua sponte the nonjoinder of necessary parties.
40. 218 La. 472, 49 So. 2d 858 (1950).
41. 218 La. at 486, 49 So. 2d at 863.
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evaluation of that interest. According to Sanders, "[t]he test as to
whether one should be made a party defendant in a given case re-
lates to the interest which he may have in the outcome of the suit
and how he would be affected by the judgment to be rendered.""2
The test is narrow and does not take into account the other in-
terests relevant to compulsory joinder: the interests of the parties
and of the public in efficient judicial administration. 8 But the court
maneuvered adroitly within the restricted ambit of that test to find
the Commissioner not a necessary party to the suit, because the
plaintiff attacked the administrative procedure, not the substance of
the Commissioner's order, and because the Commissioner "cannot be
expected to appear in court and defend all of the orders issued by
him whenever such orders are collaterally attacked" on procedural
grounds." The absentee had "no interest"'5 and thus could be excused
from defending his order,'" to the greater efficiency of both judicial
and administrative proceedings.
In City of Shreveport v. Kansas City, S. & G. Ry. Co., 7 an exprop-
riation proceeding for right of way along tracks leased by a rail-
road,'8 the absentee's interests were subordinated to those of the
litigants and the court. The plaintiff suggested joinder of the defen-
dant's lessee late in the litigation; the lessee was joined, and the
court's judgment awarded his compensation. But after judgment
the lessee, who had lost procedural rights by the tardiness of his
joinder, claimed to be a "necessary party" and sought a retrial in
which his exceptions and defenses could be heard. The court had ju-
risdiction over the lessee; thus even had he been labeled "indis-
pensable," the action could have been maintained. But because the
lessee had been paid for his losses and the plaintiff therefore was
not subject to multiple liability, the supreme court was unwilling to
grant a rehearing solely to revive the lessee's lost procedural rights.
Citing the substantive law of expropriation, which does not refer to
proceeding against anyone except the landowner,'" the court held
42. 218 La. at 492, 49 So. 2d at 865.
43. See text at note 10, supra.
44. 218 La. at 493, 49 So. 2d at 865.
45. 218 La. at 493, 49 So. 2d at 865.
46. 218 La. at 495, 49 So. 2d at 866.
47. 181 La. 458, 159 So. 2d at 715 (1935).
48. The action was brought originally against the landowner and consolidated
with similar suits against several railroads. Kansas City S. & G. Ry., a lessee, entered
the proceedings late and then sought a retrial of issues already litigated in order to
urge additional defenses and exceptions. 181 La. at 459-62, 159 So. at 716-17.
49. 181 La. at 462. 159 So. at 717.
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that in an expropriation proceeding the landowner is the "sole ne-
cessary party defendant."" Although the court based its decision on
the substantive law and used the fact that expropriation is in the
nature of an in rem proceeding, the procedural considerations
prompting the holding are not hard to ascertain: The plaintiff-city
represented an important public interest, already vindicated by full
litigation, and expropriation proceedings justify a greater emphasis
on efficiency and expedition than does purely private civil litigation.
Moreover, the lessee lost only procedural, not substantive, rights.
The court's failure to articulate the procedural reasons for its
holding is unfortunate,"' but City of Shreveport nonetheless il-
lustrates a weighing of relative interests which does not focus solely
upon effect upon the absentee."
A classic torts case defining necessary parties, as contemplated
later by article 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is Reed v. War-
50. The court also stated that "Isluits to condemn or expropriate property for
public use or in the public interest are proceedings in rem, proceedings against the
property itself .... The owner of the property and he alone has authority to speak in
defense of an action to force alienation." 181 La. at 464, 159 So. at 717.
51. The court may have been reluctant to state the holding in procedural terms
for fear of disturbing the precedent of Ashbey and Succession of Todd, which
established a general rule that lessees and mortgagees are necessary parties to litiga-
tion directly affecting their mortgages and leases. See text at notes 31-39, supra.
52. The court in Jackson v. Gulf Refining Co., 201 La. 721, 10 So. 2d 593 (1942)
similarly refused to find a servitude or mortgage holder a "necessary party" in an ac-
tion against a refining company to determine interests in oil and gas. The court
characterized the plaintiffs suit as a "petitory action" and stated that "[tihe owner of a
servitude ... on a tract of land is not a necessary party t9 a petitory action brought
against the owner of the land." 201 La. at 732, 10 So. 2d at 596. However, the court
found the absentee nonnecessary in order to protect him. The plaintiff won the original
suit, but the defendant landowner obtained a reversal on appeal; then the original
plaintiff argued that since the lessee was a necessary party who did not join the suit,
he could not take advantage of the reversal on appeal. The ruling that the servitude
owner got the benefits of the landowner's appeal protected the absentee and thwarted
further litigation by a claimant whose demands the court already had found untenable.
201 La. at 732, 10 So. 2d at 596.
It is interesting to speculate, however, on whether the court would have found the
servitude owner "necessary" had it upheld the judgment against the landowner. In
that case, the absentee should have been necessary so that the plaintiff could not col-
lect royalties from the absentee until his defenses were heard.
Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans v. City of New Orleans, 223
La. 199, 65 So. 2d 313 (1953), also refused to find the illegitimate daughter of the plain-
tiff's deceased employee a necessary party to the employer's suit against the defen-
dant for indemnification for workmen's compensation that the employer paid the child.
The absentee, already compensated by the plaintiff, had no interest in the suit; but
had the child been a "subrogor" the plaintiff would have lacked a cause of action since
the child was excluded from the Civil Code article 2315 list of beneficiaries to a
wrongful death action. The court focused exclusively on the plaintiffs interests in
order to maintain his cause of action. 223 La. at 203-04, 65 So. 2d at 314-15.
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ren," which held that all claimants of a wrongful death and a sur-
vival action under Civil Code article 2315 are necessary parties who
must bring their claims in a single suit." The substantive basis of
the decision rests upon counting causes of action in article 2315 and
is not persuasive;" but the procedural justification for the Reed v.
Warren holding is more convincing: The court remarks the un-
fairness of subjecting a defendant to "the annoyance and expense of
defending five, or perhaps ten, lawsuits, all founded upon the same
cause of action and dependent upon the same relevant facts and the
same defenses,"" and indicates some consideration for the pro-
cedural goal of avoiding duplicative litigation by arguing that "it is
just as important to avoid a multiplicity of suits on obligations aris-
ing ex delicto as on obligations arising ex contractu." 51 The court
cites concursus proceedings, partition suits, and "in fact ... all cases
where some outsider is a necessary party to the suit"" as precedent
for requiring joinder of all claimants in a single action. Having thus
based the holding, procedurally, upon the interests of the defendant
and upon public interests in efficient judicial administration, the
court weighed the interests of the plaintiff and the absentees, eval-
uating an argument raised by the court of appeal:
It is said in the opinion rendered by the Court of Appeal that, if
the court should rule that all of the sons and daughters of the
deceased ...are necessary parties to the suit, and if one of
them should be absent or unwilling to join in the suit, his ab-
sence or refusal to join ... would prevent the others from bring-
ing the suit. The answer to that ... is that the plaintiff or plain-
tiffs in such a case should have the party refusing to join in the
suit cited and ordered to say whether he will join in the suit or
abandon his claim for damages."9
Reed v. Warren illustrates a balancing of the plaintiffs' and defen-
dant's interests against the absentee's and suggests that when the
53. 172 La. 1082, 136 So. 59 (1931). The "Preliminary Statement" to the Code of
Civil Procedure's chapter on joinder identifies this decision as defining the concept of
"necessary parties" adopted by the procedural code in article 642. 2 LA. CODE Civ. P.
ANN., Preliminary Statement to Chapter 1 of Title III at 395 (West).
54. 172 La. at 1092, 136 So. at 62.
55. 172 La. at 1090-91, 136 So. at 62. See, Johnson, Death on the Callais Coach:
The Mystery of Louisiana Wrongful Death and Survival Actions, 37 LA. L. REV. 1
(1976).
56. 172 La. at 1092, 136 So. at 63.
57. 172 La. at 1097, 136 So. at 64.
58. 172 La. at 1098-99, 136 So. at 65.
59. 172 La. at 1098, 136 So. at 64. See generally Morrison v. New Orleans Public
Serv. Inc., 415 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1969).
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former outweigh the latter, litigation can continue even when a nec-
essary party cannot be joined. Conversely, if the absentee's inter-
ests are so significantly interwoven with the litigation that a judg-
ment rendered in his absence would be unfair or would invite reliti-
gation, courts may refuse to hear a matter unless the absentee is
joined.
That proposition is illustrated by Horn v. SkeUy Oil Co.," an ac-
tion to determine the ownership of a 7/8ths interest in mineral rights
to a tract of land. The absentee was the Federal Land Bank, whose
deed to the landowner's title ancestor had reserved mineral inter-
ests; the crucial substantive issue was the nature of the absentee's
reservation. The plaintiff claimed that the deed created a servitude,
now prescribed in plaintiff's favor; the defendants urged and the
lower court found that the reservation created a royalty, likewise
prescribed by ten years' nonproduction.1 The supreme court, notic-
ing on its own motion the nonjoinder of the Federal Land Bank,"
decided that in either case a decision on the prescription issue
would affect adversely the absentee and remanded the case to allow
the "impleading" of the "necessary party."" Notably, Horn v. Skelly
Oil focused solely upon the speculative interest of the absentee,
whose mineral interest, however defined, had in all likelihood pre-
scribed and who would not have been bound by that factual deter-
mination in his absence." Although the remand may have been more
efficient in this case than rendering a conditional judgment requir-
ing either party to litigate the nature of the interest and the pre-
scription issue with the absentee, Horn's significance lies in its un-
fortunate preoccupation with the effect of the litigation upon only
the absentee. If the court in fact was unwilling to give judgment
without the Federal Land Bank because the dispute involved in-
terests in immovables, failure to so state caused confusion, not
merely in later cases, but in the criteria for compulsory joinder set
forth in the Code of Civil Procedure.
Joinder in the Code of Civil Procedure: Gerontion
The crucial importance of Reed v. Warren and Horn v. Skelly
Oil is their impact upon the Code of Civil Procedure, which turned
60. 221 La. 626, 60 So. 2d 65 (1952).
61. 221 La. at 632, 60 So. 2d at 67.
62. 221 La. at 632-33, 60 So. 2d at 67-68.
63. 221 La. at 632-33, 60 So. 2d at 68.
64. Civil Code article 2286 requires that a judgment be rendered between the
same parties to have the effect of res judicata.
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to these cases in fashioning its distinction between necessary and in-
dispensable parties. The "Preliminary Statement" to the Code's
chapter dealing with compulsory joinder indicates that Reed v. War-
ren "expressly recognized and properly labeled""8 the concept of
.necessary parties," while Horn v. Skelly Oil "recognized and prop-
erly labeled the concept of indispensable parties.""
Article 641 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure defines in-
dispensable parties:
Indispensable parties to an action are those whose interests
in the subject matter are so interrelated, and would be so directly
affected by- the judgment, that a complete and equitable adjudi-
cation of the controversy cannot be made unless they are joined
in the action.
The wording of the article, like the Skelly Oil decision which was its
model, looks solely to the interests of the absentee. The article does
not, of course, mandate that a court consider only the impact of a
suit upon the nonjoined party; the phrase "complete and equitable
adjudication" operates as a "savings clause" permitting consideration
and evaluation of other relevant factors. But the cases cited treating
indispensable parties in both the "Preliminary Statement" and Com-
ment (c) to article 641 are decisions which stress the absentee's in-
terests and thus are to some extent misleading, insofar as the arti-
cle was intended to codify past jurisprudence. 7 The emphasis in the
code need not have been so restricted, since prior jurisprudence,
while giving the absentee his due, also treated other pertinent in-
terests.
Similarly, the definition of a necessary party in article 642 is
keyed to the absentee's interest in the "subject matter" of the litiga-
tion." The code's criterion for distinguishing a necessary party from
an indispensable one is both narrow, in failing to articulate other in-
65. 2 LA. CODE Civ. P. ANN. Preliminary Statement to Chapter 1 of Title III at
395 (West).
66. Id
67. The "Preliminary Statement" to the joinder chapter of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure expresses dissatisfaction with the terminological inconsistency of the decisions,
but articles 641 and 642 were, according to the Reporter, to clarify rather than to alter
jurisprudential rulings. Id at 396.
68. LA. CODE Civ. P. art 642 states, in pertinent part, that:
Necessary parties to an action are those whose interests in the subject matter
are separable and would not be directly affected by the judgment if they were not
before the court, but whose joinder would be necessary for a complete adjudica-
tion of the controversy.
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terests compulsory joinder serves, and vague, giving no standard for
determining when an absentee's interest is "separable" and when it
is not.
Compulsory joinder is a procedural means of dealing with suits
in which the interests of a nonlitigant are bound so intimately with
the interests of the parties in the object of the suit that effective
judicial administration always favors the absentee's joinder. Ideally,
these absentees, whether denominated "indispensable" or "neces-
sary," always should be joined. But joinder is not always possible or,
when possible, is not always effected. Jurisdictional barriers to
joinder or simple procedural default by litigants produce situations
in which the needed person either cannot be or has not been brought
into the suit. To deal with the problems created by these cases, the
distinction between indispensable and necessary parties developed.
The distinction is crucial because it triggers functional differences in
the way objections to the absence of needed litigants may be raised;
moreover, whether an action may be maintained without joinder of
the needed person and whether a judgment rendered in his absence
is valid and final also hinge upon whether the absentee is indispen-
sable or merely necessary.
The articles defining necessary and indispensable parties ex-
press the functional consequences arising from classification. Article
641 states that "[no adjudication of an action can be made unless all
indispensable parties are joined therein," while article 642 conceded
that "[ain adjudication of an action may be made even if all neces-
sary parties are not joined therein." Thus, an action will be dis-
missed if "indispensable" parties cannot be joined, while a suit may
proceed if a court lacks jurisdiction over a "necessary" absentee.
The most obvious effect of classification relates to jurisdiction;
classifying an absentee as "indispensable" means that if he cannot
be brought before a court, the entire action is dismissed, and other
litigants are denied relief.
More important on a practical level is the difference in treat-
ment of the pleading rules for objecting to nonjoinder of a needed
absentee. Adverse impact upon subject matter jurisdiction rarely oc-
curs in state courts;' lack of personal jurisdiction over a needed per-
son or suit in an incorrect venue occasionally created problems.'"
69. Addition of a defendant whose reconventional demand against the plaintiff ex-
ceeds jurisdictional amount limitations in city or parish courts occasionally presents a
problem. See, e.g., San-l-Baker Corp. v. Magendie, 157 La. 643, 102 So. 826 (1925),
discussed in the text at note 289, infra.
70. See. e.g.. Mire v. Hawkins, 177 So. 2d 795 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965), discussed in
the text at note 76, infra.
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But most Louisiana cases deal with joinder problems arising from
the plaintiff's simple failure to join the absentee. The defect created
by procedural laxity could be partially "cured" by joining the miss-
ing litigant, though the expense and inefficiency of a remand for this
purpose is outweighed only by the wastefulness of reversing a fully
litigated judgment because an "indispensable" person was unrepre-
sented but affected. Whether such a "cure" will be required depends
in many cases upon whether the absentee is labeled "necessary" or
"indispensable."
Article 645 of the Code of Civil Procedure governs the pleading
of nonjoinder of a needed person and states:
The failure to join an indispensable party to an action may
be pleaded in the peremptory exception, or may be noticed by
the trial or appellate court on its own motion. The failure to join
a necessary party to an action may be pleaded only in the
dilatory exception."
Thus, if a person considered "necessary" is not joined and no objec-
tion is made before an answer or a preliminary default, the action
proceeds without the absentee, unless he intervenes to assert his
claim or is joined by the defendant as a third party defendant."2
Likewise, inability to obtain personal jurisdiction over such a person
will not defeat the suit even if the dilatory exception is raised timely.
But if a person is labeled "indispensable" and jurisdiction cannot be
had over him, the action is dismissed; if his joinder is possible, the
action may be remanded even after an appellate court has given a
judgment if the supreme court takes the case on certiorari and
notices the absence of the indispensable party. 8 The characteriza-
tion of a party as "indispensable" frustrates judicial efficiency "since
71. (Emphasis added.) Code of Civil Procedure article 927(3) lists "nonjoinder of an
indispensable party" among the peremptory exceptions; article 926(8) lists "nonjoinder
of necessary party" as a dilatory exception. Article 928 governs the time of pleading.
The dilatory exception must be pleaded prior to answer or judgment by default and,
under article 926, is waived if not timely pleaded. But article 927 allows the peremp-
tory exception to be pleaded "at any stage of the proceeding in the trial court prior to
a submission of the case for a decision," and article 929 allows the exception, if in-
troduced after trial, to be "tried specially." These articles, coupled with article 645's
permission to both trial and appellate courts to notice on their own motions the lack of
indispensable parties, mean that if an indispensable party is not joined, remand or
dismissal is a threat through all stages of the proceeding. The differences in treatment
accorded necessary and indispensable parties in the Code of Civil Procedure is
discussed by Tate, aupra note 25, at 289-90.
72. The Code of Civil Procedure's incidental actions, LA. CODE Civ. P. arts.
1031-40. 1061-66, 1091-94, and 1111-16, are primarily devices for permissive joinder.
73. See, e.g., Horn v. Skelly Oil Co., 221 La. 626, 60 So. 2d 65 1952).
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no stage-preclusion bars the contention of non-joinder from being
raised or noticed even on appeal and, if upheld, from thus requiring
remand for joinder and then retrial,"7' The express codification of
the difference in pleading rules for the two "classes" of needed
litigants was intended, however, to alleviate the "confusion" created
by early decisional law."5
Because the extended period for raising an objection to the want
of an indispensable party can be manipulated by a defendant seek-
ing to prolong litigation, the "nonwaivable" peremptory exception
envisioned by article 645 can complicate litigation, thus thwarting,
rather than implementing, the judicial efficiency objective of man-
datory joinder; while provisions to compel joinder of needed persons
may eliminate the need for, or decrease the likelihood of, relitigation
in a subsequent separate action, these devices can be used to assure
relitigation in a pending or appealed action. Thus appellate courts,
in particular, should notice only sparingly the lack of indispensable
parties.
The severity of dismissing an action for failure to join a party is
shown in Mire v. Hawkins." Lessors of a mineral tract sued the co-
owners of mineral interests in the tract, seeking recognition of the
plaintiffs' mineral interests. The plaintiffs also sought to cancel
mineral leases and to establish the unconstitutionality of an order
reducing their acreage participation in a producing drilling unit;
therefore, the mineral lessees and the Commissioner of Conserva-
tion were joined also. The suit was brought in Acadia Parish, a
court of improper venue under a statute authorizing suits attacking
an order of the Commissioner of Conservation." The Commissioner
was dismissed on grounds of jurisdictional venue, and on a later ap-
74. Tate, supra note 25, at 290.
75. The procedure for raising the objection of the lack of indispensable parties, or
for the failure to join a necessary party, has caused difficulty in Louisiana. Under
the jurisprudence, one exception, that of nonjoinder of parties, has been utilized
for both purposes. This exception has long been recognized as a dilatory one
which must be pleaded prior to the filing of an answer or a default.
McMahon, supra note 20, at 12. The author suggested that while the dilatory exception
was adequate to notice the lack of necessary parties, lack of an indispensable party
should be raised through a nonwaivable peremptory exception and be subject to a
court's notice on its own motion. Id
76. 177 So. 2d 795 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965), aff'd, 249 La. 728, 186 So. 2d 591 (1966).
77. LA. R.S. 30:12 (1950). On an earlier appeal in the same suit, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeal had determined that the only proper venue for the suit against the
Commissioner was East Baton Rouge Parish, as required by the statute. Mire v.
Hawkins, 147 So. 2d 892 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962), writ denied 244 La. 116, 150 So. 2d
584 (1963).
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peal the third circuit found him an "indispensable party";8 citing ar-
ticle 934 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the appellate court stated
that "when the grounds of a peremptory exception cannot be re-
moved by amendment of the petition, the cause of action must be
dismissed. . . .No adjudication of a cause of action can be made
unless all indispensable parties are joined."79
Assuming that the Commissioner was vitally interested in the
suit and that his interest, coincident with the defendants', outweighed
the plaintiff's interest in the vitality of a long-litigated claim,"0 the
plaintiff need not have lost his suit on "jurisdictional" grounds. If
Revised Statutes 30:12 establishes jurisdictional venue in attacks on
unitization orders, the plaintiff could have sued the Commissioner in
East Baton Rouge Parish and then used article 644 of the Code of Civil
Procedure to obtain ancillary venue as to the co-owners and lessees,
whose joinder was needed for a full adjudication on the order, as
both would be affected directly and seriously by invalidation of the
order." The Mire suit was dismissed, not because jurisdiction over
an indispensable party could not have been obtained, but because
the plaintiff failed to use fully the procedural devices available in
the Code of Civil Procedure to bring all needed defendants into a
single suit."
78. 177 So. 2d at 805.
79. 1d
80. The appellate court noted that LA. R.S. 30:12 (1950) and jurisprudence constru-
ing it, particularly Everett v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 218 La. 835, 51 So. 2d 87 (1950),
forbids collateral attack on the Commissioner's orders fixing production units and re-
quires that such attacks be made directly against the Commissioner, and concluded
that the Commissioner was an "indispensable party." 177 So. 2d at 805. The court did
not articulate any balancing it might have done of competing interests, though the fact
that the defendant's interests were compatible with those of the dismissed absentee
and the traditional judicial deference to administrative determinations may have in-
fluenced the holding. Possibly the court felt little patience with the plaintiff, who
might have preserved his claim by complying with the statutory venue provisions.
81. Code of Civil Procedure article 644 arguably establishes ancillary venue with
respect to necessary and indispensable parties.
82. A similar procedural lapse by a plaintiff led to dismissal of an action on appeal
in Bolden v. Brazile, 172 So. 2d 304 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965). The plaintiffs sought to be
declared the owners of a tract of land and also sought an accounting for the value of
minerals extracted from the property, as well as damages. The plaintiffs joined in-
dividual lessors and their corporate lessees as defendants but failed to take any steps
to prosecute the claim against anyone except the lessee, Texaco. The individual defen-
dants were dismissed on the ground of abandonment; then the fourth circuit, citing
Horn v. Scelly Oil, found the dismissed persons indispensable parties. The individual
defendants were not solidarily liable with their lessee, so steps taken against Texaco
did not interrupt the five years' inaction as to the Individual defendants under articles
56 and 3519 of the Code of Civil Procedure, governing abandonment for five years' In-
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The alternative to dismissal of an action for want of an indispen-
sable party is to allow amendment of the pleadings for his joinder;
this cure is available only when a court has jurisdiction over the
absentee, and the device is most useful at the trial level, when
amendment would not upset a judgment nor involve the expense
and delay of a remand. This approach was taken in Succession of
Guidry v. Bank of Terrebonne & Trust Co.;"8 there a succession
representative brought a declaratory action against a bank, bank of-
ficer, and the officer's son for recognition of the succession as owner
of a note the defendants claimed. The plaintiff alleged that the bank
took the decedent's note as collateral security for a loan to the of-
ficer's son, that the father and son used the loan proceeds, and that
the bank accepted the note in bad faith. However, the trial court
found the petition defective in failing to allege that the officer acted
as the bank's agent; without proof of that relationship, the bank
would not be a participant in the officer's use of the loan proceeds.
The First Circuit Court of Appeal noted the "tendency of modern
practice is to yield as little as possible to technicalities and to be
liberal in upholding substantive rights""' and held that the trial
court's refusal to allow amendment as mandated by article 934 of
the Code of Civil Procedure" was error. The Guidry rationale should
be applied whenever amendment could cure a joinder defect and mi-
tigate the harsh consequences of nonjoinder of a needed litigant.
The Code of Civil Procedure establishes clearly a practical dif-
ference between necessary and indispensable parties. The non-
action. Since these defendants were dismissed, there arose "an absence of indispen-
sable parties," which could not be cured by amendment of the petition because "the in-
dividual defendants have been dismissed and plaintiffs cannot join them again in the
instant suit." The court then applied article 934 of the Code of Civil Procedure and
dismissed the suit for want of indispensable parties.
It is difficult to believe that the "comedy of errors" represented by Bolden can
have precedential value. The interests of the lessors in their title and mineral royalties
to the disputed tract were at least as keen as the interests of the Federal Land Bank
in Skelly Oil, had the court lacked jurisdiction over the lessors, it would have been
proper to classify them as "indispensable" and to refuse to allow the plaintiff to attack
their interests in their absence. But once these parties were before the court and prop-
erly joined, the fourth circuit should have noticed their critical interest in the suit
before allowing their dismissal, rather than waiting until after they had become
"absentees" by judicial order to mandate their joinder. The court, impatient with the
plaintiff's lack of diligence in pressing their claim against the lessors, seems to have used
the "in dispensable parties" label as a vehicle for dismissing the action, letting the
plaintiffs' lassitude operate to their own disadvantage.
83. 193 So. 2d 543 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1966).
84. Id. at 547.
85. Id. at 547-48.
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joinder of an indispensable party cannot be waived and can affect
radically the final disposition of a case on appeal; nonjoinder of a
necessary party is a waivable dilatory exception. But the absence of
specific criteria indicating whether these vastly different procedural
consequences should apply to a given case constitutes a gaping flaw
in the Code's treatment of joinder. It was left to the Louisiana
judiciary to give content to the distinction and to fashion criteria to
define "indispensable" and "necessary" parties in the context of par-
ticular litigation.
The judiciary, of course, was limited to the cases brought before
it in fulfilling its implied task, and particularized contexts necessarily
limited the scope and clarity of the criteria case law could supply.
The equities in specific cases influence decisions which, when read
as establishing broad principles of joinder, may be misleading. But a
survey of joinder cases decided under the Code of Civil Procedure
does yield some general guidance as to when a party is indispen-
sable and when not.
Post-Code Jurisprudence: News f/r the Delphic Oracle
The early cases on compulsory joinder decided under the Code
of Civil Procedure show a high degree of protection afforded the in-
terests of absentees when litigation involves, as in Skelly Oil, inter-
ests in immovables or mineral rights. The cases illustrate, although
they do not always articulate, several reasons courts hesitate to en-
tertain actions involving interests in immovables without joinder of
all whose claims might be affected: first, jurisdiction over the absen-
tee presents little problem when the action asserts interests in Loui-
siana immovables; second, because these proceedings resemble in
rem actions, focusing on interests in Louisiana real property,
judicial efficiency and efficacy of judgments mandate resolution of
all interests in a single proceeding; third, resolution of all claims in
one action protects defendants against multiple liability. And, if the
interests not only of the absent potential claimant but of the liti-
gants before the court require the presence of the absentee to
resolve a critical issue, courts are apt to find him indispensable.
For instance, in Martin Timber Co. v. Roy," an action for partition
by licitation, the owner of a fractional interest in land sold his mineral
interests to a third person while the partition was pending. The
state supreme court held that the transferee of the mineral inter-
86. 244 La. 1050, 156 So. 2d 435 (1963).
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ests "should and must be made a party to this proceeding"' and
remanded the case for his joinder, even after the court of appeal had
affirmed the district court's judgment ordering sale of the property."
The supreme court considered joinder essential to resolve several
vital questions. The court addressed the absentee's interests in the
issue of whether he could be deprived by a partition judgment or-
dering sale of the property "clear of encumbrances"" of mineral in-
terests acquired while the partition was pending. A determination of
this issue was crucial also to distribution of the sale proceeds,'
which would affect all parties to the partition, and was also essential
in notifying future bidders of precisely what was being sold. The su-
preme court was interested in protecting a future buyer from "buy-
ing litigation," for if the mineral transferee was not bound by the
partition judgment, nothing would prevent his suing the purchaser
after the sale. Thus the court looked beyond the interests of the
nonjoined parties and found that the rights of present parties, of
prospective bidders, and of judicial economy would be served by re-
mand for relitigation of the partition action after joining the trans-
feree.
A similar balancing of interests required joinder of all mineral
lessors in Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Jones," a suit by a mineral
lessee for a declaratory judgment of royalty rights under mineral
leases. The suit hinged upon the effect of a Commissioner's com-
pulsory drilling unit upon a previous contractual unit, when some
lessors in the contractual unit were included in the Commissioner's
unit and some were not." The Louisiana Supreme Court focused
upon the language of the Declaratory Judgment Act and decided:
87. 244 La. at 1058, 156 So. 2d at 438.
88. The court of appeal had considered whether the transferee was a necessary
party and decided that he was not; the appellate court ruled that the provisions of arti-
cle 741 of the Civil Code, which states that a mineral interest is unaffected when its
owner is not joined as a party to a partition sale, did not apply when the mineral in-
terest was acquired when the partition was pending. Thus the transferee was left only
a cause of action against his vendor and had no interest in the partition. 244 La. at
1058, 156 So. 2d at 437.
89. 244 La. at 1053, 156 So. 2d at 436.
90. 244 La. at 1055. 156 So. 2d at 436-37.
91. 241 La. 661, 130 So. 2d 408 (1961).
92. Resolution of this issue was critical in determining how to distribute the pro-
duction royalties from the Commissioner's unit; Humble urged that when the Commis-
sioner of Conservation creates a forced unit overlapping a prior conventional unit, the
forced unit does not abrogate the contractual unit, which must be considered in
calculating the royalties due to the lessors; the defendants, owners of interests in the
forced unit, understandably argued that the Commissioner's unit preempts and that all
acreage excluded from the forced unit is disregarded in calculating royalty payments.
241 La. at 670-73, 130 So. 2d at 411-12.
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We do not understand ... that the statutory provision that "no
declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to
the proceeding" nullifies the explicit language that "all persons
shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would
be affected by the declaration." . . . It is essential that an af-
fected, interested person be cited in the action when his ex-
istence and claim are evident."
However, the court did not consider solely the possible rights of the
absentees,' but also evaluated the effect of resolving the crucial
substantive issue upon various other parties and nonparties in both
units and upon the lessee-plaintiff. The determination that the ab-
sentees were indispensable was motivated partially by the goal of
avoiding relitigation in various suits of issues which might be re-
solved in the pending action.
The solicitude Louisiana courts display for interests in im-
movable property is shown also by Roussel v. Noe," which found in-
dispensable absentees who stood to lose title to mineral leases as a
result of a taxpayer action seeking to declare state leases null and
seeking mandamus against the Mineral Board to force it to rescind
approval of lease assignments made by the defendant. The first cir-
cuit in Roussel gave no explanation for finding the assignees and
later owners of the leases indispensable,"' but the facts that the
plaintiff knew the identity of these parties, that jurisdiction over
them presented no problems, and that joinder of all would be more
efficient than separate actions justify the holding and remand.
However, although these cases suggest that when the object of
the suit is similar to the object of an in rem action, the nature of the
subject matter is the predominant joinder consideration, they should
not be read to mean that all owners of mineral interests are in-
dispensable to all actions affecting mineral rights. In Fontenot v.
Sun Oil Co." the Louisiana Supreme Court refused to find indispen-
93, 241 La. at 670, 130 So. 2d at 411.
94. The contractual lessors excluded from the forced unit would lose their rights
to payments if the forced unit nullified the prior agreement, though they might bring a
later action against the lessee. 241 La. at 671, 130 So. 2d at 412.
95. 274 So. 2d 205 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
96. The court merely stated that:
If these leases are invalid as to Noe, they are invalid as to all other parties. Plain-
tiff has set forth with particularity the alleged illegal acquisition of Noe's and
others' interests in these leases, including the subsequent assignments and pre-
sent owners of the remainder. Certainly, all parties who have an interest in these
leases are indispensable.
The court then cited article 641 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Id at 211.
97. 257 La. 642, 243 So. 2d 783 (19711.
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sable three owners of overriding mineral royalties when a lessor
who previously had obtained a judgment cancelling mineral leases
sued the lessee, Sun Oil, and the royalty owners for an accounting
on production. The original cancellation suit was brought against
Sun Oil and its six overriding royalty owners. Three of the royalty
owners were absentees represented by a curator ad hoc," and these
defendants did not appeal the cancellation judgment. On appeal by
Sun Oil and the other royalty owners, certain of the leases were ex-
cepted from cancellation; no accounting for production on the ex-
cepted properties was due to plaintiff. However, on appeal of the
suit for an accounting, the court of appeal ruled that the nonappeal-
ing royalty owners owed an accounting even from the excepted por-
tions of the leases because these royalty owners were indispensable
parties who had failed to appeal the cancellation judgment and thus
were bound by it." The supreme court held that the appeal by the
lessee had preserved by rights of Sun Oil's royalty owners, who prob-
ably were not even necessary parties to the second suit. The holding
was based upon the derivative nature of the right the royalty owners
had, as contingent upon the rights of their lessee.
The holding evoked a dissent from former Justice Summers,
who maintained that the non-appealing royalty owners were at least
necessary parties to the second suit who, under article 644 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, could be forced to join as defendants, and
whose failure to appeal the first judgment made both judgments bind-
ing upon them.'" The majority recognized, however, that the plain-
tiff's claims for a "full accounting" were in fact directed against Sun
Oil, as the plaintiff sought nothing directly from the royalty owners,
against whom the plaintiff had no contractual rights. Characterizing
the royalties as "appendages to the leases" and the rights of the
royalty owners as "accessory,"'"' the supreme court studied the par-
ties' substantive relationships and concluded that if the plaintiff had
98. 257 La. at 644. 243 So. 2d at 783.
99. 257 La. at 644. 243 So. 2d at 783.
100. 257 La. at 611-622, 243 So. 2d 789-90.
(Tlheir failure to appeal makes the issues adjudicated ... final insofar as they are
concerned. Any contrary position is inconsistent with Article 644 of the Code of
Civil Procedure which declares that a necessary party who refuses or fails to join
in and assert his rights in an action which he should join may be joined as a
defendant and required to assert his rights or be precluded thereafter from as-
serting them. To refuse to give final effect to the adjudication against the over-
riding royalty owners in this case would make the right to join necessary parties
an empty gesture.
257 La. at 66243, 243 So. 2d at 790 (Summers, J.. dissenting).
101. 257 La. at 661, 243 So. 2d at 786.
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no valid claim against its lessee for production on the excepted
leases, the plaintiff had no rights against royalty owners whose in-
terests were contingent upon Sun Oil's leases. Thus Sun Oil's appeal
protected the interests of the royalty owners."'
The court found that as a matter of both law and common sense
the royalty owners' failure to appeal was irrelevant.'03 Refusing to
construe articles 641 and 642 to make the appeal issue decisive, the
court noted doubts as to whether the royalty owners were either ne-
cessary or indispensable'" to an action against Sun Oil for account-
ing, The court also refused to interpret article 644 of the Code of
Civil Procedure as determinative of the parties' substantive rights.08
Here, the court focused upon the nature of the plaintiff's claim and
upon the practical impact of requiring joinder: The plaintiff's in-
terests were defined by the cancellation judgment; he had no in-
terest in sands not excluded except his interest under the still valid
lease. The lessee-defendant might have risked inconsistent duties
had he owed production royalties on these sands to both the plaintiff
and the royalty owners. But since Sun Oil's interest in the lease
coincided with the interests of the royalty owners, no practical
reason required the royalty owners to assert the lease's validity. Ar-
ticle 644 was not intended to expand substantive rights; thus the
court's emphasis on the substantive claims of the parties and absen-
tees, as opposed to reflex resort to labels, illustrates a pragmatic
and practical evaluation of joinder.
Another line of cases interpreting articles 641 and 642 of the
Code of Civil Procedure indicates that Louisiana courts will find an
absentee indispensable when his presence would protect the state's
interests or the rights of state administrative agencies. Fuselier v.
State Market Commission'" was a taxpayer action to enjoin the
defendant Market Commission from making, and a grain corporation
from receiving, a loan from the state for construction of rice storage
bins; the court held that another state agency, the Bond and Build-
ing Commission, authorized by statute to issue state bonds,0 7 was in-
dispensable to an action to enjoin the loans on the grounds that is-
102. 257 La. at 652-53, 243 So. 2d at 786.
103. 267 La. at 652, 243 So. 2d at 786.
104. 257 La. at 653-54, 243 So. 2d at 787.
105. 257 La. at 654-55, 243 So. 2d at 787.
106. 331 So. 2d 652 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
107. LA. R.S. 47:1704 (repealed and replaced by LA. R.S. 39:452 (Supp. 1960, 1964,
& 1968)).
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suance of the bonds was unconstitutional. 8 The court's solicitude for
the prerogatives of administrative agencies seems the critical factor
in ordering a remand. Other concerns prompting the judiciary to
label the absentee indispensable, which may be of doubtful prece-
dential value if lifted from the context of the suit in which the in-
terests arose, include protection of the plaintiffs interest,'" protec-
tion of an absentee from prejudice from collusion between the plain-
tiff and defendant," ' and use of the label as grounds for dismissing a
frivolous claim."'
108. The court noted that a ruling that issuance of the bonds was unconstitutional
would "necessarily constitute an adjudication that the State Bond and Building Com-
mission cannot issue the bonds" and therefore would affect that agency's interests so
"directly" that "a complete and equitable adjudication of the controversy cannot be
made unless it is joined in the action." 231 So. 2d at 655.
109. In Dugas v. Insurance Co. of St. Louis, 134 So. 2d 634 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961),
a mortgagee insured under a "loss payable" clause in a collision policy issued by the
defendant was held indispensable when the mortgagee settled with the insurer to the
possible detriment of the plaintiff's claim for damages to his automobile; the court joined
as "indispensable" an absentee who had no interest in the suit, having already obtained
satisfaction from the defendant, because the mortgagee's absence might have prejudiced
the rights of the plaintiff:
[Tihis defendant is an indispensable party to this lawsuit. The suit looks to
recovery by the owners and coinsureds of their undivided share of proceeds due
on an insurance policy under which the mortgagee was also insured, and in these
circumstances in which a conflict of interest could prevail plaintiff's claim could
not have been validly adjudicated unless the mortgagee was also before the court.
Id. at 639.
110. Di Maggio v. Capaldo, 131 So. 2d 87 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961) held a sublessee
anindispensable party to a summary proceeding to require the lessee to vacate leased
premises for allowing illegal gambling. The court stressed the express authorization of
the sublease by the lessor, and the language of the decision might be read to suggest
that privity between a lessor and sublessee is enough to give the sublessee "indispen-
sable" status in an eviction against the lessee. From a procedural standpoint, privity
should be irrelevant. Here the plaintiff sued a defendant with little or no interest; the
party who would be affected was not joined, and collusion between the plaintiff and
defendant to frustrate the sublessee's interests is suggested. There was no jurisdic-
tional barrier to joining the sublessee, and the court's remand was fair.
111. Warner v. Clarke, 232 So. 2d 99 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ refused 255 La. 913.
233 So. 2d 565 (1970), presents an interesting "quirk" by using a procedural device to
dispose quickly of a trivial claim. The plaintiffs, trespassers on certain levees, sought a
declaratory judgment that private lands were subject to public use and an injunction
against prosecution for trespass. The court refused to give declaratory judgment on
the grounds that the landowners were not joined as defendants: "The nonjoinder of an
indispensable party may be noticed by the appellate court on its own .... We cannot
decide whether [these] lands are burdened with a servitude unless the owners of the
land are parties to the litigation." 232 So. 2d at 101.
The court did not remand for joinder, but found the plaintiffs' claims unmeritorious,
as under the relevant criminal trespass statutes, LA. R.S. 32:292 (Supp. 1968) and LA.
R.S. 38:213.1 (Supp. 1968), the trespass on the levees was illegal even if the levees
were burdened with a servitude favoring the public.
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Similarly, in Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Milazzo,"2 an in-
surer's action to enjoin the insured's succession from proceeding
with arbitration of a claim against the insurer, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeal found the State Insurance Commissioner an in-
dispensable party to the action because the insurer attacked the
constitutionality of Revised Statutes 22:1406(D)(5) (1950) as vesting
the insured with the exclusive right to invoke arbitration in settling
disputed claims on uninsured motorist coverage. Finding that the
thrust of the plaintiff's attack was directed, not at the statute, but
at a regulation of the Insurance Rating Commission which required
all policies to contain a provision allowing arbitration,"' the court of
appeal noted that the Insurance Code outlines the procedure for
challenge to a regulation of the Insurance Rating Commission."'
Since the statutory procedure requires an administrative hearing,
the court concluded that failure to comply with the mandatory pro-
cedure was a "collateral attack on the constitutionality of an in-
surance regulation and as such completely ineffectual"; because
the jurisdictional venue requirement was not met and because the
plaintiff did not join the Commissioner, an "indispensable party in
a declaratory proceeding seeking to have adjudicated the constitu-
tionality of a regulation of any commission created under the Loui-
siana Insurance Code,""' the fourth circuit reversed a judgment
favoring the plaintiff. In so doing, the court protected the adminis-
trative prerogatives of the Insurance Rating Commission by refus-
ing to allow collateral attack of a regulation in private litigation.
The Commissioner's interest was identical to the public interest and
112. 265 So. 2d 298 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
113. Id. at 300.
114. In order to successfully assail a regulation of the Louisiana Insurance Rating
Commission, it is mandatory that there be strict compliance with the prescribed
statutory procedures set forth in the Insurance Code. . . .The Louisiana In-
surance Rating Commission and more particularly the Casualty and Surety In-
surance Division created under LSA-R.S. 22:1401 is charged with the respon-
sibility of regulating automobile liability insurance. LSA-R.S. 22:1406. subd. D. It
is empowered to permit submission of claims to arbitration. LSA-R.S. 22:1406,
subd. D(5). The statute provides for a hearing and review of any ruling or regula-
tion of the Rating Commission (LSA-R.S. 22:1418), and prescribes the procedures
therefore in LSA-R.S. 22:1351-1365. All orders of the Commissioner resulting
from said hearing are subject to review by the district court under LSA-R.S.
22:1360, which provides:
****The petition for such review shall be filed only in the district court in and
for the parish of East Baton Rouge and shall be taken only from an order refusing
a hearing or an order on hearing.
Id. at 300-01.
115. Id. at 301.
116. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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outweighed the plaintiffs interest in a private injunction when he
failed to follow statutory procedures designed to protect the public
interest by assuring its representation through the official desig-
nated to regulate insurance activities.
When a party seeks relief from a governmental body or official,
failure to join the particular party charged to perform the respon-
sibility at issue is crucial. A judgment commanding an official to per-
form an act he has no authority to perform would place that defen-
dant in an impossible position and would be ineffective and there-
fore pointless. The courts may salvage a suit filed against the wrong
defendant by mandating joinder of the governmental entity with the
authority to grant the relief the plaintiff seeks. Firemen's Pension &
Relief Fund for the City of Lake Charles v. Sudduth" ' thus solves
the problem; the plaintiff pension fund had sought mandamus to
command the mayor of Lake Charles to pay into the fund a sum
equaling four percent of the total salaries of all fire department
employees. When the mayor protested that he had no ministerial du-
ty under the relevant statute,"1 the plaintiff sought leave to amend
his petition. The Third Circuit Court of Appeal found the City of
Lake Charles to be "an indispensable party" because it was the entity
"directed by the statute to pay the funds"; the appellate court used
article 646 of the Code of Civil Procedure and remanded to allow
joinder of the city, improperly denied by the lower court."'
Not all cases requiring joinder are so sensible. One criticized
case, Consolidated Credit Corp. of Baton Rouge, Inc. v. Forkner,'"
held indispensable the first mortgagee in a declaratory action on the
distribution of the proceeds of a judicial sale. The mortgagee's sole
interest in the distribution was the extra-legal interest in obtaining
his share of the'proceeds "early," for the sale was made subject to
his mortgage. The sole effects of remand for his joinder were to pro-
long further the judgment creditor's execution of his judgment, to
subject the parties to extra expense, and to clog the court with
pointless litigation. '
The cases in which the courts refused to require joinder also
help define, at least by negative implication, criteria for the labels of
117. 276 So. 2d 727 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
118. 1944 La. Acts, No. 144, as amended by 1970 La. Acts, No. 236, 1976 La. Acts,
No. 347 & 1978 La. Acts, No. 656.
119. 276 So. 2d at 733.
120. 219 So. 2d 213 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
121. Tate, supra note 25, at 291.
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articles 641 and 642. The courts are reluctant to require joinder
when the absentee had notice of litigation pertinent to his interests
but took no steps to preserve his own rights, when joinder might
complicate review of administrative proceedings or hamper agency
effectiveness, and when the joinder issue is moot.
Baton Rouge Production Credit Association v. Alford, " an ac-
tion by a judgment creditor to cancel from the public records a con-
tractual mortgage executed by the debtor, demonstrates judicial re-
luctance to join parties who took no steps to protect their own inter-
ests. The plaintiff maintained that the contractual mortgage was
simulated and given without consideration. The absent transferee
was outside Louisiana, but the trial court established communication
with him. He did not intervene, and the court appointed an attorney
to represent him at the plaintiffs suggestion."' The court of appeal
found the disinterest exhibited by the mortgagee "damaging" evi-
dence that he lacked real interest in the mortgage.'" Doing lip ser-
vice to the res judicata aspect of mandatory joinder, the court refused
to decide whether the absentee, whose court-appointed attorney was
not served properly, would be bound by a finding that the mortgage
was simulated.15 The court admitted that under Louisiana jurispru-
dence the holder of a note usually is an "indispensable party" to a
suit attacking the instrument;1" but the court adopted the rule
prevalent in other jurisdictions1' that "a person who while suit is
pending acquires an interest in property which will be affected by
that litigation is not an indispensable party to the proceedings in-
volving the property, although he may be entitled to intervene
therein.'" In Alford the court used a pragmatic approach to protect
the judgment creditor's execution of his judgment without further
delay, refusing to let possible collusion between the defendant and
the absentee hamstring the court to prolong litigation in which the
absentee's interest was merely fictional.
122. 235 La. 117, 102 So. 2d 866 (1958).
123. 235 La. at 119, 102 So. 2d at 867.
124. 235 La. at 122, 102 So. 2d at 868.
125. 235 La. at 122, 102 So. 2d at 868. In view of its assessment of the absentee's
lack of interest, the court probably did not expect him to litigate the issue later
anyway.
126. 235 La. at 123, 102 So. 2d at 868.
127. The prevalence of the adopted rule is asserted only through citation to legal
encyclopedias and to one Arkansas case, Galbreath v. Estea, 38 Ark. 599 (1882). 253
La. at 123, 102 So. 2d at 868-69.
128. 253 La. at 123, 102 So. 2d at 868.
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A similar approach was taken by the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peal in Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Fruge,13 an expropria-
tion proceeding by a utility company against the defendant's rice
farmland. The absentee tenant and servitude owner was a witness
for the defendant in the original action and had on prior appeal been
nominated a "necessary party";' nonetheless, when the second ap-
peal reached the third circuit, the tenant still had not been joined;
the court refused to prejudice the plaintiff's rights or to expend fur-
ther energy by allowing the expropriation to be delayed by a nonliti-
gant who had had every opportunity to assert his interests already.
The judiciary's reluctance to find indispensable parties in ac-
tions related to administrative proceedings probably is prompted by
efficiency considerations. In State v. Board of Zoning Adjustments
of the City of New Orleans.,8 the Vieux Carre Property Owners &
Associates, Inc. challenged the defendant's grant of a building per-
mit to property owners who wanted to erect a garage in violation of
zoning restrictions; the licensees intervened in the action but were
not joined on appeal. The supreme court refused to find the gran-
tees indispensable parties to appellate review of the agency action.13
The court's rationale is not well articulated, but the decision hints
that courts are not eager to let those opposing agency action force
the agencies into complex litigation on review by requiring joinder
of every party affected by agency action, particularly since the af-
fected group often would be large enough to require a class action.
Nor are courts willing to force the state or its administrative agen-
cies to participate in private litigation when the state or agency has
no direct interest at stake.' Walmsley v. Pan American Petroleum
Corp.' involved proceedings to cancel a mineral lease executed by
the State Mineral Board insofar as the lease affected record title to the
plaintiff's property. The supreme court painstakingly construed the
petition to create an action to remove cloud from title, rather than
as a petitory action claiming ownership, in order to avoid com-
pulsory joinder of the state as a party defendant. "
129. 227 So. 2d 606 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969), writ refused, 255 La. 149, 229 So. 2d
732 (1970).
130. 210 So. 2d 375, 377-78 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968). The case was remanded for
joinder of the tenant-servitude owner so that he could claim his damages to his irriga-
tion canal.
131. 251 La. 691, 206 So. 2d 74 (1968).
132. 251 La. at 704-05, 206 So. 2d at 78-79.
133. See text at notes 107-19, supra.
134. 244 La. 513, 153 So. 2d 375 (1963).
135. The supreme court noted that had the plaintiffs brought a petitory action, the
title to the lands would be at issue. The State Mineral Board, a joined defendant, could
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One of the most procedurally significant of the cases in which a
court declined to find compulsory joinder is Hayward v. Noel.'" The
owner of a one-third undivided interest in real estate claimed dam-
ages for the defendant's alleged trespass. The First Circuit Court of
Appeal refused to find the owners of the two-thirds undivided in-
terest indispensable to the action, but instead limited the plaintiff's
recovery to her share [one-third] of the total damages."' By limiting
the plaintiff's interest to her virile share of the damages, the court
structured a judgment to avoid exposing the defendant to excessive
liability should the other co-owners later seek damages. Although
the court could have forced joinder of the co-owners as necessary
parties under the authority of article 644 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, the court avoided the increased costs and delays that pro-
cedure would entail by rendering a pragmatic judgment which saved
added strain on judicial resources. The cases demonstrate the pro-
priety of sidestepping relitigation when a particular case is suscepti-
ble of more efficient resolution and serves as a precedent for the ap-
plication to Louisiana joinder cases of factors outlined in Federal
Rule 19(b).
A few cases on compulsory joinder deal with objections that a
party already joined is superfluous. In State v. Ferris,u an ex-
propriation suit, the state on appeal urged that the lessee, awarded
payment by the trial court, was not a necessary party to the action;
the supreme court noted that the issue was "purely academic" since
"the State, having joined the lessee as a party defendant, is hardly
in a position to complain."' " Similarly, in Vernon Co. v. Adams,'
wherein a creditor of a dissolved partnership sued a former partner
who filed a third party demand against the others, the court held
not stand in judgment for the state were the state's title to lands assailed; the state
would have to be joined. 244 La. at 519, 153 So. 2d at 377.
To avoid this problem, the court determined that the plaintiffs' petition did not
allege ownership except as "collateral to the main demand, which is to remove a cloud
on plaintiffs' record title." 244 La. at 522, 153 So. 2d at 378.
Since only the validity of the lease, insofar as it clouded record title, was attacked,
ownership between the plaintiffs and the defendants would not be decided, and the
state need not be joined. 244 La. at 524-28, 153 So. 2d at 379-80.
136. 225 So. 2d 638 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ refused, 254 La. 857, 227 So. 2d 595
(1969).
137. 225 So. 2d at 641.
138. 227 La. 13, 78 So. 2d 493 (1955).
139. 227 La. at 23-24, 78 So. 2d at 496. Dicta in State v. Ferris hints that a lessee
may be an indispensable party to an expropriation action, although the court neither
specifically considered City of Shreveport, see text at note 47, supra. nor announced a
ruling on the issue.
140. 165 So. 2d 541 (La. App,. 1st Cir. 1964).
I
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that the two partners who had contracted upon dissolution to pay
the particular debt at issue were indispensable to the proceeding.",
The partner contractually absolved of liability was "not an indispen-
sable party,"'" but the trial court should not have sustained his ex-
ception of no cause of action, because keeping him a party in the
suit would eliminate "a multiplicity of suits for determination of in-
demnification and liability among joint obligors."'ld
Judicial Realism and Lamar: The Importance of Being Earnest
The attempt by the courts to give concrete content to article
641 produced a "hodge podge" of jurisprudence: While the courts in
the main evaluated pragmatically the effects of nonjoinder in in-
dividual cases, the functional rationale of the decisions was obscured
by catchwords or apparantly facile classifications which might, as in
Roussel v. Noe,'" be a shorthand for critical analysis, or might, as in
Forkner,"I be a substitute for analysis.
Insofar as Louisiana cases do define which absentees are neces-
sary and which indispensable, the task of sifting through cases to
identify criteria for classification is time-consuming and offers
numerous opportunities for error. The inefficiency and confusion
resulting from the failure of the Code of Civil Procedure to clearly
define joinder stands in marked and shabby contrast to the clear ar-
ticulation of joinder principles outlined in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The federal system distinguishes clearly "persons to be joined if
feasible" under the criteria of Federal Rule 19(a)"' and absentees
141. Id. at 542-43.
142. Id. at 643.
143. Id The court cited Code of Civil Procedure articles 642 and 643 for authority
for its determination that the, former partner, once joined, should not be released until
a&H issues relevant to him were resolved.
144. 274 So. 2d 205 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973), discussed in the text at note 95, supra.
145. 219 So. 2d 213 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969), discussed in the text at note 120,
supra.
146. The criteria for joinder of "necessary" parties is given in Fi1). R. Civ. P. 19(a):
A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not
deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be
joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be ac-
corded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the
subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his
absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that
interest or (i) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial
risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason
of his claimed interest.
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who should be deemed "indispensable" if, after consideration of the
criteria of Federal Rule 19(b), a court determines that an action can-
not proceed without such persons."7 Both classes are needed to do
complete justice;" but a necessary party "may be excused if the
court is unable to obtain jurisdiction""'-partial justice being
preferred to no justice-while the presence of a person deemed in-
dispensable is essential to the suit, which may be dismissed if the
court is unable to compensate for the impact of his absence through
shaping relief, as suggested in Federal Rule 19(b). The federal
system also distinguishes in the pleading of absence of a necessary
party and of an indispensable party in Rule 12(h),'" which allows
raising the lack of an indispensable party as late as at trial, but does
not afford the same length of time for objecting to lack of a person
who should be joined if feasible.
Against the backdrop of Louisiana's jurisprudential confusion
and the Federal Rule's clarity, the Louisiana Supreme Court in 1973
decided State Dept. of Highways v. Lamar Advertising Co. of Loui-
siana, Inc.,"' the most significant pronouncement on compulsory
147. Before finding an absentee "indispensable" a federal court is ordered to con-
sider, under Rule 19(b) the following factors:
IFlirst, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be pre-
judicial to him or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective
provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the pre-
judice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the per-
son's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate
remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
Rule 19 and Rule 21, allowing a court to order joinder of a party on its own motion at
any stage of the proceedings, create broad discretion In the trial court. See Comment,
supra note 9, at 887 for a discussion of the court's discretion under these articles prior
to the 1966 amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
148. See Reed, supra note 1, at 483-84. Reed's functional analysis of joinder provided
impetus for the revision of the federal joinder rules in the 1966 amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The contribution of the Reed article is noted in
Lewis, supra note 1.
149. Reed, supra note 1, at 483. Federal joinder cases often entail a dimension un-
common in state court proceedings -joinder of a needed litigant may destroy subject
matter jurisdiction in diversity actions. The implications of the problem and its impact
on early federal jurisprudence on joinder is treated by Reed, supra note 1, at 517-37.
150. Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure notes that failure to join
an indispensable party is not waived if not filed before answer but may be raised as
late as trial. The treatment afforded pleading this objection before amendment of
Federal Rule 12 in 1966 is discussed in Comment, supra note 9, at 887; Eagleton, supra
note 9, at 621-22 suggests that because pleading is not a "game" but a "tool" for keep-
ing a trial as "simple and intelligent" as possible, the trial judge should have the final
word on joinder issues in most cases.
151. 279 So. 2d 671 (La. 1973).
19811
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
joinder since the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure. The De-
partment of Highways had brought seven separate suits to enjoin
the owners of advertising signs from maintaining the signs along the
highways; the cases were consolidated, and on appeal the circuit
court held that the landowners upon whose lands defendant's signs
were posted were indispensable parties to the suit and had remanded
for their joinder.' Former Justice Tate, writing for the supreme
court, used the Lamar suit to review the goals of compulsory
joinder and, in effect, to adopt the criteria of Federal Rule 19 as the
standard for pragmatic analysis under article 641 and 642 of the
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. Noting that the Louisiana pro-
cedural code had adopted the joinder classifications of the original
Federal Rules,'" Justice Tate remarked:
Unfortunately, this new formulation of indispensible and
necessary parties has not proven a satisfactory guide for our
courts in the cases decided since the adoption of the new code.
To the contrary, the rigid application of the terminology by the
courts has led to decisions which are apparently more dependent
upon the label the court has attached to a particular party than
upon the underlying factual basis for labeling a party indispen-
sable, necessary, or merely proper. '"
The court reviewed the procedural consequences which flow from la-
beling a party indispensable as opposed to necessary 55 and noted
that "[tihese differences in the way the absent party affects the
case, and the possible harsh result if the party is ruled indispen-
sable, mandate that such a classification be applied to a party only
after the facts clearly establish that no complete and equitable ad-
judication of the controversy can be made in his absence."'11 Then
the court reminded trial and appellate courts that "great care must
be exercised to insure a proper factual analysis of the party's inter-
est in the case before a determination of the party's classification is
made."' Although Lamar reached the state supreme court after ap-
pellate notice of lack of indispensable parties after trial, the court's
instructions apply to decisions on joinder before litigation: The court
announced an interpretation of articles 641 and 642 which forbids
exclusive focus upon the speculative interests of absentees.
152. 271 So. 2d 49 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
153. 279 So. 2d at 674.
154. Id. at 675 (emphasis added).
155. I& at 673-75.
156. Id. at 675.
157. Id.
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The defendants in Lamar urged that the absent landowners had
a keen interest in the suit because "Itihe signs may under the terms
of the agreement belong to the landowners rather than the sign-
erector defendants" so that sign removal would deprive the land-
owners of rentals.' The supreme court reminded the appellate court
of the res judicata element of joinder: that absentees are not legally
bound by adjudications in which they are not represented.' The
problem, then, was not that nonjoinder would legally prejudice the
absent landowners, but that their nonjoinder might have adverse
practical effects upon them (loss of rentals) and, equally important,
that the plaintiff Department of Highways, might face further litiga-
tion in order to remove the signs if the landowners took further ac-
tion by asserting a claim. But the most vexing aspect of the circuit
court's ruling was that the record reached the supreme court with-
out revealing a factual analysis of these interests, but instead in-
dicated that the court of appeal had based its holding solely upon
speculation about the absentees' interests.'" The narrow focus upon
the landowners' interests combined with apparent willingness to ac-
cept vague speculation upon the extent of that interest prompted
the supreme court's objections:
The court of appeal in effect held that the courts of this
state are powerless to adjudicate a controversy between parties
properly before the court if such adjudication may affect con-
tract rights one of the parties alleges he has with an absent
third person. The result of such a rule, if upheld, is to permit
skillful counsel by filing conclusory pleadings and by artful argu-
ment, to convince a trial, judge that property rights of an absent
third person may be affected and therefore have a plaintiff's suit
delayed or dismissed, without any factual determination whether
these contract rights will in fact be affected by the court's ac-
tion, or to what extent they will be affected.''
158. Id. at 674 (emphasis added).
159. Id. at 675.
160. No factual analysis of the rights of the parties and absent persons could have
been made. Thus, it is difficult to determine how the previous courts arrived at
the conclusion that the property rights of the landowners would be detrimentally
affected by a judgment ... in the absence of any evidence to support such a con-
clusion.
Id. at 675 (emphasis added). The supreme court's remarks on the scantiness of the
record on joinder issues suggests that if a court finds an absentee indispensable, the
finding should be supported by facts and analysis in the record to demonstrate that
the finding was the product of a proper analysis, rather than of unthinking classifica-
tion.
161. Id. at 675-76. The echoes of a "jurisdictional" approach to joinder implicit in
the reference to judicial impotence highlight the dangers of "pigeonhole" classification.
1981]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Furthermore, the landowners in Lamar were not the only group
of unrepresented persons whose interests might have been asserted
to thwart the plaintiff's suit: Even were the landowners joined on
remand, the defendant could have raised on yet another appeal the
peremptory exception to assert the interests of the defendant's
clients, "the advertisers, whose products or services are advertised
on these signboards,"'" in order to delay further the suit to congest
the docket of the trial and appellate courts. This point was raised in
Lamar to illustrate that the peremptory exception of nonjoinder of
an indispensable party is subject to manipulation and abuse. To
counter possible abuse, courts need flexibility in treating the excep-
tion; and a model of practical flexibility is available, the court noted,
in revised Federal Rule 19,'6 an anecdote to "an overly technical
non-functional interpretation of our own Code's equivalent pro-
vision."' "
The Lamar court found that the "unfortunate wording""' of ar-
ticles 641 and 642, with exclusive emphasis upon the absentee's in-
terests, encourage skimpy and inadequate analysis of joinder ques-
tions because "[n]o mention is made of the possible hardship to the
parties before the court"'" if the finding that an indispensable
litigant is missing results in "defeat of substantive rights through
procedural technicalities,"'" a result clearly not intended by the
Code of Civil Procedure:' "
The defect in our article, if interpreted without regard to the
overall purpose of the code, is that ... Itihe plaintiff may be left
without any remedy, although he has a valid legal right and has
before the court the person against whom that right should be
exercised, merely because a third party also has rights which
may be affected by the judgment.'"
Litigants cannot be allowed to convince a court that it is "powerless" unless the im-
pact of nonjoinder would, as a practical matter, render an adjudication meaningless;
but whether that would result cannot be determined by examining only the possible in-
terests of absentees without the court's considering its ability to protect those in-
terests by limiting or conditioning the judgment.
162. Id at 676.
168. Id. (discussion of the amendment to the federal rule).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id
168. Article 5051 of the Code of Civil Procedure commands that: "The articles of
this Code are to be construed liberally, and with due regard for the fact that rules of
procedure implement the substantive law and are not an end in themselves."
169. 279 So. 2d at 677.
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Since the goal of joinder under both Louisiana's and the federal pro-
cedural schemes is to "prevent injustice" and since the defects of
the original federal pattern were cured by the flexible and pragma-
tic criteria of the amended rule, the Lamar court, without ruling on
whether the landowners were indispensable, implicitly adopted the
revised federal criteria as the proper interpretation of Louisiana's
joinder provisions. The supreme court, moreover, indicated pointedly
that the tag of indispensability is to be applied only in extreme cir-
cumstances to defeat or delay litigation:
[P]arties should be deemed indispensable only when that
result is absolutely necessary to protect substantial rights. A
close factual analysis of the cases ... reveals that very few ab-
sent parties are absolutely indispensable to the litigation before
the court. The court, by the shaping of its decree, may be able
to avoid any possibility of prejudice to the rights of an absent
party and still do justice to the parties before the court.1 0
The court in Lamar need not have based its interpretation of ar-
ticles 641 and 642 solely upon analogy to Federal Rule 19. Louisiana
jurisprudence, both before and after enactment of the Code of Civil
Procedure, in fact considered a wider range of pertinent factors
than the wording of the code's joinder articles encompasses.'" But
the court's use of the amended federal rule, in lieu of previous state
cases, probably was intentional. The court intended in Lamar to pro-
vide criteria to be used in evaluating joinder issues; and though
prior cases show a pragmatic approach and balancing of interests,
no single case- set forth all the various interests which might arise in
a given case. If the shortcomings of articles 641 and 642 were to be
overcome by a definitive interpretation of joinder's function, the
clarity and conciseness of the federal rule was more useful and
direct than a recommendation that Louisiana courts re-study previ-
ous cases. The Lamar court could not, of course, go so far as to say
that articles 641 and 642 are equivalent to Federal Rule 19 or to
adopt the Federal Rule in lieu of the Code's by blatant fiat. But the
references to the common goals and history of the federal and Loui-
170. Id at 677.
171. For examples of pragmatic analysis prior to adoption of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, see Ashbey v. Aahbey, discussed in the text at notes 33-39, supra; City of
Shreveport v. Kansas City S. & G. Ry. Co., discussed in the text at notes 47-52, supra
Reed v. Warren, discussed in the text at notes 53-59. supra.
Examples of a multi-factored analysis of joinder issues after the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure was enacted include Martin Timber Co. v. Roy, discussed in the text at notes
86-90, supra, and Humble Oil and Refining Co. v. Jones, discussed in the text at notes
91-94, supra.
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siana joinder provisions, the praise of the federal rule's express
recognition of the scope and variety of concerns joinder addresses,
and the clear commands that appellate courts consider the interests
of the parties before the court, develop a record to support joinder
rulings. And applying the label "indispensable" sparingly leaves lit-
tle doubt that joinder under the Code of Civil Procedure is to be ap-
proached both functionally and frankly.
The fundamental advantage of the federal approach is that it en-
courages articulation of the balancing test joinder requires. Lamar
was a call, not only to pragmatism, but to clarity. Courts are not
simply to decide joinder questions, but are to outline the facts and
weighing process prompting a particular ruling, to develop an evolv-
ing and comprehensive jurisprudence on joinder. The thrust of
Lamar was to eliminate the twin evils of labeling: the defecit of the
analysis in some cases, the obscurity of the rationale in others.
Unfortunately, the tonic Lamar offered to the inconsistent
discussions of joinder in Louisiana cases is diluted by the apparent
failure of subsequent joinder cases to adhere to the standards
Lamar announced. Lamar's command to use sparingly the "indispen-
sable party" label has been ignored in a number of later appellate
decisions; equally disappointing is the failure of post-Lamar jurispru-
dence to articulate the balancing of interests Lamar mandates.
Post-Lamar Cases: The Road Not Taken
The failure of the appellate courts to take Lamar seriously is
most apparent in a group of cases involving claims to real property
and is reminiscent of Horn v. Skelly Oil Co.' Litigation involving ex-
propriation,' 8 succession or trust property,' or simulation claims' 5
focuses -upon property within Louisiana and may be likened to in
rem proceedings: The relationship between the Louisiana property,
the suit, and the parties who own interests in the property is so
close that jurisdiction over the interest-owner generally is assured.
Louisiana courts traditionally have given staunch protection to such
property interest, "' and both judicial efficiency and finality justify
so doing. In cases where the interests of those with claims to real
172. 221 La. 626, 60 So. 2d 65 (1952).
173. City of Shreveport v. Kansas City, S. & G. By. Co., 181 La. 458, 159 So. 2d 715
(1935).
174. Succession of Burgess, 323 So. 2d 914 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
175. Phillips v. Great So. Mortgage & Loan Corp., 350 So. 2d 1279 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1977).
176. See the cases discussed in the text at notes 86-96, supra.
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property require joinder, Louisiana courts are quick to consider ab-
sent interestholders "indispensable" and to mandate their joinder as
a condition for maintaining an action. In in rern-like proceedings the
nature of the subject matter of the litigation is the most crucial
joinder factor. However, the continued failure of courts to state the
reasons those with interests in immovables or successions and
trusts are "indispensable" violates the dictates of Lamar.
A recent example of such an action in Guice v. Modica," a credi-
tor's action to nullify a debtor's donation of an immovable to his
children. The second circuit held the donees to be indispensable par-
ties, basing the ruling upon the obvious interest of the donees in the
litigation, which posed a direct threat to their title." Since the suit
involved immovable property in Louisiana, joinder of the donees
would not involve jurisdictional problems, and the court of appeal
remanded for joinder. When the absentees are the present property
owners, their joinder is feasible; and if the claim is that theydo not
in fact own the property, joinder is needed to avoid both prejudice
to them and relitigation of ownership between them and the party
attacking their title. But more sweeping statements that all parties
allegedly involved in simulated sales or that all heirs must join one
heir's action to set aside a sale of a decedent's property are not
justified in light of Lamar's insistence upon close analysis of the
facts of individual cases before a party is determined indispensable.'
177. 337 So. 2d 302 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
178. As owners of the property, the children have an interest in the action that
would be directly affected by any judgment rendered in this suit. They should not
be subjected to a possible divestiture of their title without being made parties to
the suit.
Id. at 303.
179. 279 So. 2d at 675. The inadequate articulation of the rationale in Guice is
reflected also in Succession of Terral, 301 So. 2d 754 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974). affd in
part and revd in part on other grounds, 312 So. 2d 296 (La. 1975). The Second Circuit
Court of Appeal held that heirs, seeking to set aside four acts of sale as simulations or
disguised donations, were not entitled to bring a class action; citing article 641 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, the appellate court upheld the trial court's determination that
six absent heirs were "indispensable parties" in a suit against co-heirs for simulation;
no reasoning was offered to support affirmance of the trial court's dismissal of the
plaintiff's suit.
Perhaps the second circuit gave short shrift in Terral to the joinder issue because it
was subordinate to the plaintiffs request for class action certification.
However, in Oby v. Flanagan, 356 So. 2d 1047 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977), the First Cir-
cuit Court of Appeal likewise held all other forced heirs indispensable parties to a son
and forced heir's action to set aside as a simulation a sale of land by the deceased
father, citing article 641 of the Code of Civil Procedure in lieu of explaining why the
presence of the absent heirs were not protected by the plaintiff's assertion of an in-
terest coincidental with theirs.
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Succession of Burgess,' a forced heir's attack upon a will and
trust, presented the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal an opportunity
to explore in detail joinder issues relating to several categories, of
possible parties; but the decision is disappointing for its failure to
use the analysis Lamar suggests. The fourth circuit instead focused
upon the declaratory judgment articles"' and upon article 29311" of
the Code of Civil Procedure, treating these provisions as supplying
extra rules defining indispensable parties in a declaratory action to
attack a will or trust.'" The court of appeal mandated summarily the
joinder of the testamentary executor and trustees"' and of the usu-
fructuary and beneficiary under the trust.'' Although the court did
not state a rationale for joinder of these parties, the obligation of
the trustees to carry out the provisions of the trust instrument and
the direct interest of the usufructuary and principle beneficiary of
trust income in a suit to alter the duties of the trustees and the in-
come of the beneficiary would suggest that joinder is fair, par-
ticularly when, as here, personal jurisdiction poses no problems and
joinder is made timely before trial. The appellate court considered
more carefully the object of the plaintiff's action and whether in
light of his claim the residuary legatees should be called indispen-
sable or necessary parties:
The two children of plaintiff are legatees of the residual estate.
Plaintiff's allegations are that the terms of the will have infringed
upon his legitime, and he asks that his legitime be computed on
180. 323 So. 2d 914 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
181. The court cited LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 1871, 1872, & 1874 and found particularly
relevant article 1880.
182. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2931 provides that:
A probated testament may be annulled only by a direct action brought in the
succession proceeding against the legatees, the residuary heir, if any, and the ex-
ecutor, if he has not been discharged. The defendants shall be cited, and the ac-
tion shall be tried as an ordinary proceeding.
i83. If this action was brought directly as an annulment of the probated testament
under the provisions of Article 2931, it would be required that the heir proceed
against the legatees, then residual heirs and the executor. We perceive no dif-
ference in the requirements of this declaratory judgment suit and we hold that
the defendants [the trustees, the usufructuary and beneficiary under the trust,
and the residuary legatees) meet the requirements of indispensable parties set
out in C.C.P. article 641.
323 So. 2d at 917.
184. Article 742 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the trustee is the pro-
per defendant in suits to enforce obligations against a trust.
185. "It is further not open to argument that the usufructuary of an heir's legitime
and the beneficiary of trust income are indispensable to a suit attacking the validity of
the usufruct and the validity of the trust." 323 So. 2d at 918.
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a basis other than that proposed in the will and by the ex-
ecutors; he asks that those portions of the will which cause his
legitime to bear an undue portion of inheritance taxes, etc., due
by other legatees be declared null, and he seeks to declare the
residual trust null. Under these circumstances the residual lega-
tees are indispensable and not simply necessarily parties, and
the specific legatees other than the plaintiffs father and
children, are, more likely than not, indispensable parties.'"
Despite its attention to the plaintiff's demands, the court's finding
that the residuary legatees and specific legatees were indispensable
parties is couched in conclusory terms; the determination in respect
to the specific legatees is suspect in light of Lamar and of the
court's admission that "it really does not appear that those specific
legacies could encroach upon the plaintiffs legitime," but that "it is
within the realm of possibility, dependent upon the facts, that their
specific legacies might be affected."' 7 The court finally based its
finding upon the fact that the legitime might be burdened with
taxes on the specific legacies and upon article 293 1.'" But the
troublesome aspect of this reasoning is that it is grounded in
speculation.
The joinder holdings in Burgess, given the similarity of the ac-
tion to an in rem action, are justified under an analytic test: Juris-
diction presented no problem; all the interests asserted hinged upon
a single instrument, giving a close factual density to the various in-
terests so that resolution of the issues in one suit is efficient. By
resolving the validity of the trust in one proceeding, the court could
protect the trustees against inconsistent claims against them. And
article 2931, while not controlling, indicates the extent and degree of
interest legatees and executors have in the validity of an instrument
conferring benefits and duties upon these persons. The problem
with Burgess, a perennial problem in cases involving property in-
terests, is that the court did not state the reasons joinder should be
required and did not by a close account.of its reasoning show that in
some similar cases joinder of specific or residuary legatees might
not be necessary. If, for instance, these persons lived in New York
or France, the delay, expense, and inconvenience of requiring their
joinder as defendants might outweigh the convenience and tidiness
of joinder, since the trustees could represent adequately the in-
terests of the legatees. Burgess, then, frustrates the aspects of
186. 1&
187. Id.
188. M&
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Lamar that demand articulation of the balancing involved in joinder
determinations and suggests that the treatment of joinder currently
afforded by Louisiana's courts yields sweeping and overly broad
statements of questionable precedential value.
The most problematical of the post-Lamar cases dealing with in-
terests in immovables is Phillips v. Great Southern Mortgage &
Loan Corp.,"' in which a defendant posited simulation as a defense
to an action brought by the plaintiff-landowner for illegal seizure of
the plaintiff's property. The defendants were a creditor of a former
owner of the land and the sheriff, who seized the property at the
creditor's behest. The seizure was invalid, and the plaintiff's plea for
an injunction and damages would be enforceable unless the creditor
could establish that the property passed to the plaintiff as a result
of simulated sales.'" The creditor, however, failed to join prior
transferors and transferees of the property who were allegedly in-
volved in a simulated sale by the debtor."' Noting that a creditor at-
tacking a sale as a simulation has the burden to establish that the
sale was simulated and operated to his injury,"" the Third Circuit
Court of Appeal insisted that the creditor "must join all transferors
and transferees to the simulated sale or sales since they are [all] in-
dispensable parties."'" The court reasoned that since it was "ab-
solutely essential" that the absentees be joined to prove simulation,
nonjoinder meant that "the issue as to whether or not the sales in
question were valid or invalid was not properly before the trial
court... and clearly could not be adjudicated by the trial court."'"
The court expressly based its grant of an injunction to the plaintiff
upon the fact that the creditor failed "to join indispensable parties"
to the defense of simulation. 1'
Several aspects of Phillips are troubling; the third circuit omit-
ted any indication of the balancing of interests required by Lamar
and failed to articulate any rationale for holding the absentees in-
189. 350 So. 2d 1279 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
190. Id. at 1281-82.
191. Although defendant-appellant alleges that the sale from Sarah Winn to Addie
and William Washburn is a simulation, it did not cause these parties to be joined
in this litigation and no evidence appears in the record concerning the sale. Addi-
tionally. defendant-appellant seeks to have the Washburn-Phillips sale adjudged a
simulation but failed to join the Washburns as parties.
Id. at 1281.
192. Id. at 1281-82.
193. Id. at 1282.
194. Id.
195. Id.
180.' [Vol. 42
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dispensable. Moreover, the court's treatment of the effect of non-
joinder suggests a jurisdictional theory of joinder: Because the
absentees were not present, the creditor's defense was simply not
before the court. The appellate court did not remand for joinder but
dismissed the alleged defense out of hand. If the court considered
the defense frivolous, the decision should have so stated frankly in-
stead of inserting into Louisiana case law a jurisdictional view of
joinder discarded by modern theorists and inconsistent with Lamar's
demand that courts consider shaping judgments or conditional relief
to avoid prejudice to the parties if joinder of needed absentees is
impossible.'"
The joinder issue in Phillips boils down to a matter of proof. The
court of appeal believed that without the absentees, the defendant
could not prove the sales simulated. An analysis of the interests of
the plaintiff and absentees reveals no reason to consider the trans-
ferors and transferees "indispensable" save to prove defendant's
claim. The plaintiff's claims were in no way contingent upon action
against the absentees, so the plaintiff had no reason to join them in-
itially. If the court were concerned with protecting the absentees, it
failed to state that interest, and examination of the absentees' prac-
tical interest reveals only the kind of speculative or remote con-
tingency Lamar noted as insufficient to compel joinder.'" The absen-
tees retained no present interest in the property; were the defen-
dant to establish simulation, these persons would be liable to the
present plaintiff if he asserted an action in breach of warranty or
for rescission. But unless the absentees were parties to the present
action, a ruling on simulation would not bind them, and they could
assert their defenses in a later action. Only the far-fetched con-
tingency that the plaintiff might lose his land if the defendant
established simulation, but might forfeit reimbursement if the
breach of warranty or recission action were defended successfully in
a later suit, would justify insisting on the absentees' joinder in
Phillips. But the court of appeal did not mention this possibility; nor
did it suggest that the plaintiff might have joined its vendor once
the simulation defense was raised. Thus the reasons for insisting on
joinder were obscure, and the court foreclosed a defendant's estab-
lishing simulation should joinder prove impossible.
The question of jurisdiction over the absentees was not raised in
Phillips; but the case differs from the usual in rern-like action in
that the transferors and transferees retained no present interest in
196. 279 So. 2d at 677.
197. Id. at 676.
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the property. In a similar situation the prior property-owners con-
ceivably could have left Louisiana without leaving property relevant
or connected to the simulation claim so that joinder would be fore-
closed for want of personal jurisdiction over the absentees. In that
case, the third circuit's overbroad statements that joinder of trans-
ferors and transferees is "absolutely essential" implies that a
creditor with a simulation claim would not be allowed to assert it
either as a plaintiff or in the Phillips posture, and procedural rules
would defeat substantive rights, in violation of both Lamar and arti-
cle 5051 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The courts' interest in protecting the prerogatives of adminis-
trative agencies in pre-Lamar cases continues to be a concern in con-
temporary joinder decisions. As noted before, courts will find absen-
tees indispensable to litigation when that finding preserves the
rights of administrative agencies, of governmental officials, and of
the public interest these entities represent." In Lamar the state
supreme court questioned the use of nonjoinder of indispensable
parties to defeat an action brought by the State Department of High-
ways, which represented the public interest.'" Later cases preserve
the tendency to protect administrative and governmental preroga-
tive when the absentee represents the public interest or is a govern-
mental employee whose functions might be inhibited by suits in which
he is not represented. Probst vi City of New Orleans'" was a tax-
payer action to nullify a city property tax levy on the New Orleans
central business district; the plaintiff, an affected property owner,
claimed that the tax upon an artificially designated geographical
unit was repugnant to state and federal equal protection guarantees
and to the state constitutional right to uniform taxes; he also sought
reimbursement for the tax payment he had made under protest."'
The fourth circuit found that the tax collector was not a necessary
defendant to the attack upon the constitutionality of the tax."2
However, the procedure for reimbursement of taxes paid under pro-
test is fixed by statute,m and the tax collector is the sole proper
defendant to a reimbursement claim; thus the appellate court
remanded for the "limited purpose" of joining the tax collector as a
198. See text at notes 106-119, supra.
199. 279 So. 2d 671 (La. 1973).
200. 325 So. 2d 665 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976)b rev'd on other grounds. 337 So. 2d
1081, (La. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 916 (1976).
201. 325 So. 2d at 670.
202. Id.
203. LA. R.S. 47:2110 (1950 & Supp. 1970 & 1980).
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defendant, allowing him to present his defenses.2 The remand was
mandated by statute and was necessary if the plaintiff were to ob-
tain the relief he sought because the tax collector, not the city, was
the governmental official with authority to repay the tax should the
judgment order reimbursement. But the fourth circuit, instead of ar-
ticulating that joinder was essential to the interests of both the
plaintiff and the absentee, concentrated upon the relevant pro-
cedural statute and then noted that "the court is powerless" to cast
the tax collector in judgment if he is not before the court.-an undis-
putable proposition which does not, however, assist in erasing rem-
nants of a jurisdictional approach to joinder and in replacing them
with the pragmatic model Lamar urges.
Lamar's command that courts state the reasons for their joinder
rulings also was ignored in Trahan v. Larivee,m another case involv-
ing the interests of public officials not joined by the plaintiff. The
plaintiffs were a radio station and its general manager, who sued
the mayor and city administrative officers for disclosure of the per-
formance evaluation reports of various city department heads. The
city filed a separate action for declaratory judgment; the suits were
consolidated for trial, but none of the city employees whose perfor-
mance records were sought were joined as parties, even though the
defendants urged that public disclosure would violate the privacy of
these individuals.' The Third Circuit Court of Appeal quoted article
641 and without further analysis concluded that "[s]ince the rights of
the various city directors are so interrelated and would be affected as
a result of this litigation, we feel that these persons are indispensable
parties to the proceedings."" Noticing their nonjoinder on its own
motion, the appellate court remanded, reversing and setting aside
the trial court's judgment. The third circuit's attention apparently
was fixed exclusively upon the privacy interests of the absentees,
though it is probable that these persons were aware of the suits and
apparently had made no effort to intervene, perhaps believing that
their interests would be represented adequately by the named de-
fendants, who, in fact, urged the absentees' privacy rights before
the appellate court.
Remand for relitigation to compel a trial court to hear essentially
repetitive individual defenses and evidence seems patently ineffi-
cient in this case; the perfunctory treatment of joinder in Trahan im-
204. 325 So. 2d at 671.
205. 359 So. 2d 329 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
206. Md at 331.
207. Id.
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plies that the appellate court did not consider joinder's goals of
avoiding relitigation and of protecting the plaintiff's claim against
defeat or undue delay. Possibly, although no analysis in the opinion
so indicates, the court was concerned with protecting the defendants
from later liability claims from the absentees if the defendants were
ordered to disclose the evaluations. However, this interest is specu-
lative and remote and would not under Lamar justify the remand.
The court more likely was affording the city employees protec-
tion-whether convenient to them or not-reminiscent of the solici-
tude the judiciary displays for governmental and administrative
agencies. But if the joinder ruling was prompted by reluctance to
subject city employees to possibly adverse publicity, that rationale
should have been disclosed, not disguised by an apparently unthink-
ing application of the "indispensable party" label.
The courts since Lamar have continued to mandate joinder
when it will prove the plaintiff's right of action or will define the
scope of a defendant's liability or obligations. In so doing, the courts
implement the supreme court's reminder in Lamar that joinder in-
volves the interests of the parties, as well as of the absentees. In
Tropicana Pools South, Inc. v. Chamberlain"" the Second Circuit
Court of Appeal commanded joinder of an "indispensable" nonresi-
dent absentee in order to establish proof of the plaintiff's right of
action against the defendant for the amount owed on a written con-
tract for construction of a swimming pool. The plaintiff, suing on the
contracts, was not a party to it; the contract was signed by the defen-
dant and by an individual absentee, who the plaintiff claimed had
acted as its agent. The absentee's signature on the contract did not
establish that he acted in a representative capacity.2" The trial
court had sustained defendant's exception of "no cause of action and
no right of action contending that Tropicana Pools South, Inc. was
not the 'proper party plaintiff"' 10 because there was no indication
that the plaintiff had rights under the contract, though the defen-
dant had admitted that at the time of contracting he though the ab-
sentee to be a "representative" of the plaintiff. The trial court had
characterized the absentee as a "necessary" party and ordered his
joinder, then sustained the defendant's exception when joinder
proved impossible because the absentee had left Louisiana. While
taking issue with the lower court's nomenclature, the appellate court
agreed that "this adjudication undoubtedly would affect Russell's
208. 324 So. 2d 29 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975).
209. Id, at 31.
210. Id
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rights under the contract. Since Russell's was the only signature
besides the defendant's, Russell should be required to assert or
disclaim his rights in and to the contract.""' The second circuit then
discussed articles 644" and 645 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
luoting the reporter's comments"' to conclude that if the absentee
were characterized as "indispensable" instead of "necessary," he
would be amenable to service of process through a court-appointed
ttorney "so that an adjudication can be made rather than thwarted.""'
rhe court then, predictably, found the absentee indispensable and,
ikening the subject matter of the litigation (the contract) to a "res
)efore the court,"'' analogized to an in rem attachment to justify
appointment of an attorney ad hoc to give the absentee "the con-
stitutional protection required by law and due process.""'
The jurisdictional ploy used by the court in Tropicana is con-
stitutionally precarious since Shaffer v. Heitner'" applied the same
connexity standards to quasi-in rem jurisdiction as are required for
personal jurisdiction;"' but the use of the legal fiction to. support
jurisdiction probably was unnecessary under the Lamar test, since
the absentee arguably was not indispensable to this suit, which
could have proceeded without him. The Tropicana court did not
state frankly its reasons for classifying Russell as indispensable, but
his joinder was "necessary" only as a means of proving the plaintiff's
right to sue on the contract."' Proof of the agency relation might
have been established through the plaintiff's business records, or
the plaintiff might have sued on a theory of unjust enrichment,
rather than suing directly upon the contract.
Were the court concerned that the absentee might have rights
in the contract which might be slighted in his absence, the court
211. Id. at 31.
212. Article 644 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure provides:
If an indispensable party, or a necessary party subject to the jurisdiction of the
court, who should join as a plaintiff refuses or fails to do so, he may be joined as a
defendant and required to assert his rights in the action or be precluded
thereafter from asserting them.
213. 824 So. 2d at 31-32, (quoting LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 644).
214. 324 So. 2d at 32.
215. Id.
216. 1d.
217. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
218. Leathers, Forum Juridicum: The First Two Years after Shaffer v. Heitner, 40
LA. L. REV. 907 (1980).
219. The court of appeal in Tropicana cited.Childers v. Police Jury. 9 La. App. 490,
121 So. 248 (2d Cir. 1928), which held that an undisclosed principal can sue directly a
person contracting with the principal's agent on the principal's behalf. 324 So. 2d at 32.
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could have specified that the judgment rendered by the trial court
protect those interests and shield the defendant from possible double
liability by providing that the plaintiff obtain a release from the
absentee or by stipulating that the plaintiff would defend or satisfy
any subsequent claim on the contract that the absentee might press
against the defendant. The plaintiff's interest in compensation for
services and the defendant's interest in the conclusive effect of the
judgment could have been served by judicial creativity without a fic-
titious joinder of a person over whom the court lacked personal ju-
risdiction and whose actual interest in the contract was doubtful. A
modified judgment would afford the absentee more real protection
than his representation through an attorney who might be unable to
contact Russell or to discover facts to support a claim if the absen-
tee really retained an interest. When the lack of personal jurisdic-
tion over the absentee would foreclose his joinder, a conditional
judgment is preferable to fictional representation yielding a judg-
ment subject later to collateral attack on jurisdictional grounds by a
person supposedly before the court and therefore "bound" by the
adjudication.
An agency-principal relationship between a defendant and an
absentee triggered dismissal of a plaintiff's action for conversion in
Reilly v. Houma Body & Fender, Inc.,w wherein failure to join the
"necessary" principal as a defendant would, according to the trial
court and first circuit, have left a sheriff exposed to liability." The
defendant towed the plaintiff's vehicle upon the sheriff's orders; the
first circuit concluded that the sheriff would be affected by possible
liability to the plaintiff, though if the plaintiff recovered his
damages from the defendant, the maxim against double recovery
should have foreclosed danger to the sheriff on that score. More-
over, the court reasoned, the absentee might be liable to his agent
"for any expenses incurred in the execution of its duty."m Thus the
court found the sheriff a necessary party "whose interests can be in-
directly affected"m and dismissed the suit when the plaintiff did not
amend his petition to join the sheriff. ' In light of the uncertainty of
220. 364 So. 2d 201 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
221. The trial judge's findings establish a principal-agency relationship between the
Sheriff and the defendant and based on that determination the applicable general
rule is that a principal is liable to third persons for acts committed by the agent
while acting within the scope of his authority.
Id. at 202 (citing LA. Civ. CODE art. 2380).
222. Id. (citing LA. CiV. CODE art. 3022).
223. ld
224. Id at 203.
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the indirect effect upon the absentee and the possibility of protect-
ing him with a conditional judgment, dismissal seems a harsh remedy;
if the court suspected collusion between the plaintiff and absentee
to prejudice the defendant, a factor which would justify dismissal
under prior jurisprudence, a statement to that effect would have
contributed to needed clarity in developing joinder law. m
One might expect Lamar's influence to be most evident in cases
finding joinder not compulsory. But it is impossible to assert with
conviction that Lamar changed the responses of Louisiana appellate
courts to cases dealing with necessary parties. That the courts do
not find an absentee indispensable when his interest does not seem
to warrant mandatory joinder is not a departure even from the lop-
sided statutory test of the absentee's alleged interestm of article
642, although Lamar may have sparked closer scrutiny of those in-
terests. A realistic, practical assessment of the absentee's interests
is demonstrated in Lilliedahi & Mitche4 Inc. v. Avoyelle8 Trust &
Savings Bank.' The plaintiff-corporation sued a bank to recover
proceeds from certificates of deposit, payable to the corporation,
which the bank had cancelled at the request of the corporation's
president, who applied the proceeds to reduce his personal debt to
the bank. The defendant urged before the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peal that the succession representative of the deceased president's
226. An example of a post-Lamar decision compelling joinder of an absentee to
elicit evidence needed to protect a party is Succession of Smith, 359 So. 2d 234 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1978). The administratrix of a succession filed a tableau of distribution op-
posed by the decedent's children of a former marriage. The Second Circuit Court of
Appeal upheld the trial court's ruling that when a contested issue is the existence and
validity of a debt allegedly owed to the decedent's retail corporation, the corporation is
an indispensable party to the contest. The Smith decision is similar to the "in
rem-like" decisions, wherein the nature of the substantive rights at issue are the
determinative factor in a joinder analysis. The corporation's interest in recovering
from the succession justified compulsory joinder when no jurisdictional barrier to
joinder existed and when joinder would protect the succession representative against
inconsistent obligations to the heirs and the corporation. Moreover, joinder was
ordered at the trial level, so the appellate court's affirmance did not disturb a previous
judgment nor delay litigation. The sole flaw in the resolution of the instant joinder
issue was the court's disinclination to state its rationale.
226. An example of insufficient absentee interest to justify joinder is Travelers In-
demnity Co. v. Reserve Insurance Co.. 364 So. 2d 1041 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978). Citing
Lamar, the f'ist circuit held that an insured is not an indispensable party to a dispute
between a primary insurer and an excess insurer for a declaratory judgment as to
which insurer is liable for interest on the excess portion of a judgment against their in-
sured, as "no substantive rights of [the insured) would be affected by either a
favorable or unfavorable ruling against Reserve." Id. at 1043.
227. 352 So. 2d 781 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
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estate was an indispensable party because "in order for plaintiff to
recover, Lilliedahl would have to be found a mismanager of cor-
porate funds, converter, or a breacher of fiduciary duties.', Holding
that the succession representative was not indispensable, the third
circuit, citing Lamar,m pointed out that the defendant urging
joinder did not show how a judgment would impair the rights of the
succession' and that the defendant did not raise the exception of
nonjoinder of an indispensable party until appealing a judgment for
the plaintiff. The absentee's interest in the suit simply was insuffi-
cient to support his joinder at the appellate level; the plaintiff was
making no claim against the succession, and even if a favorable judg-
ment for the plaintiff implied that the decedent was guilty of con-
version, the judgment would not so state and would have no effect
against the succession. Other equities militating against joinder, not
discussed in the opinion, are the unfair prejudice to the plaintiff
with a judgment and the waste of judicial resources in remand when
a defendant raises an exception of nonjoinder on appeal merely to
delay execution of a judgment.
The remoteness of the interests of a party claiming after inter-
vention to be indispensable was also the basis for the supreme court's
determination in In re Succession of Harleaux'81 that the wife and
child of a decedent, although beneficiaries of a trust, are not indis-
pensable parties to an action by a law firm to collect attorney's fees
from the trust. ' Burgess can be distinguished because the plaintiff
sought disbursement of trust funds but did not assert a claim touch-
ing the validity or property interests set out in the trust itself. The
supreme court noted that in deciding which persons are indispensa-
ble to a suit against a trust, article 641 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure must be read in conjunction with article 74 2m and with the
provisions of the Trust Code which stipulate that one duty of a trus-
tee is "to defend actions that may result in a loss to the trust
estate. ''m The supreme court concluded that these statutes make it
clear "that the only indispensable party to a suit against a trust is
the trustee."21
228. Id. at 785. •
229. MS at 786.
230. I
231. 359 So. 2d 961 (La. 1978).
232. Id. at 963.
233. Id
234. LA. R.S. 9:2093 (Supp. 1964).
235. 359 So. 2d at 963.
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Just as Louisiana courts traditionally have required joinder of
governmental entities to protect public interests, the judiciary ex-
cuses these bodies from participation in litigation when their inter-
est is remote or nonexistent. Decisions since Lamar illustrating this
principle stress the absentee's disinterest. In State v. Ward' the
state instituted a possessory action against the heirs of the donor of
a wildlife refuge and the corporate lessees of oil and gas leases
granted by the heirs. The defendants converted the possessory ac-
tion into a petitory action by claiming ownership of the property.!"
The state then raised the exception of nonjoinder of the Wildlife
and Fisheries Commission, as successor to the alleged donee;"' the
appellate court upheld the trial court's ruling that the Commission
merely managed the tract and that the state as owner was the sole
defendant needed in the petitory action." An interesting joinder
question involving whether a city was an indispensable party to a
breach of contract action by a subdivision owner against a street
contractor and its liability insurer and against an engineering firm
was presented in Howard Building Centre, Inc. v. Hale.'u The defen-
dants claimed that the City of Waldo, Arkansas, owned the streets,
alleging that the streets were dedicated to the city. The appellate
court found the claim to be "without merit" because insufficiently
supported by proof"' and gave the joinder exception no further con-
sideration. The issue of dedication probably would have been
governed by Arkansas property law, and the defendants apparently
did not develop the contention with proof of either facts or Arkan-
sas law; the court was justified in refusing to mandate joinder of an
Arkansas city upon mere allegation of interest. The second circuit
also may have opined that even if the city owned the streets, it
might have an action against the plaintiff for defects; or the court
simply might have decided that the plaintiff, as a matter of obliga-
tions law, had an action against the defendants regardless of present
ownership of the streets. Also, jurisdictional barriers militated
against requiring joinder in this case."'
2386. 314 So. 2d 383 (La. App. 3d Cir.). writ refused. 819 So. 2d 440 (1975).
237. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3657.
238. At the time of the donation, the Board of Commissioners for the Protection of
Birds, Fish, and Game served the functions of the present Wildlife and Fisheries Com-
mission. 314 So. 2d at 388.
.239. Id. at 388-89.
240. 309 So. 2d 364 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
241. Id. at 3866.
242. When an absentee's interest in litigation is insufficient to require his Joinder,
the joinder issues may be resolved by reference to substantive law indicating his lack_
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An approach similar to Hayward v. Noel's... was used by the
Third Circuit Court of Appeal in Jardell v. Sabine Irrigation Co.,
Inc.,"' which shows judicial ingenuity in shaping a judgment to avoid
joinder. The plaintiff was a farm lessee who sued an irrigation com-
pany for breach of a contract to irrigate the plaintiff's rice crop, for
damages from flooding his soybeans, and for bonus payments under
a program instituted by the defendant. The defendant evoked a
statute allocating crops in sharecropping leases between lessors and
lessees' to argue that the lessor was an indispensable party. The
third circuit instead designated the lessors as necessary parties
with "separable" interests because the plaintiff abandoned his
claims for damages to the part of the crop that the lessor owned and
because the trial court was able to shield the defendant from double
liability by calculating damages to allow "defendant a credit equal to
the portion of the crop designated as rent for the landowners."""
The pragmatic damage calculation insulated the absent landowners
from possible prejudice while serving the legitimate interests of the
parties. The appellate court also preserved the trial court's judg-
ment, thus conserving judicial resources, by designating the absen-
tees merely necessary parties and noting that by failure to raise
timely the dilatory exception of nonjoinder of necessary parties the
defendant had "waived its right to conipel joinder of the land-
owners."
247
A survey of the cases after Lamar shows that the supreme
court's attempt to rephrase Louisiana's joinder law has had little ap-
preciable effect.4 Louisiana courts still weigh the interests of the
of interest. In Rosenthal v. Caballero, 309 So. 2d 797 fLa. App. 4th Cir. 1975), a lessor's
action against a lessee for rent and the cost of restoring the premises, the court of ap-
peal referred to articles 2681 and 2682 of the Civil Code, which establish that owner-
ship is not required for a binding lease, to support a holding that the plaintiff's co-
owner had no rights under a lease executed solely between the plaintiff and the defen-
dant: the co-owner therefore was not a necessary party, and the dilatory exception filed
after judgment in the trial court was ineffective.
243. 225 So. 2d 638 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
244. 346 So. 2d 1365 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
245. LA. B.S. 9:3204 (1950) declares that "'iln a lease of land for part of the crop,
that part which the lessor is to receive is considered at all times the property of the
lessor."
246. 346 So. 2d at 1369.
247. Id.
248. Lamar is seldom cited in later cases; of the cases discussed above, only two
cite Lamar: Li~liedahl & Mitchel Iic. v. Avoyelles Trust & Sav. Bank, 352 So. 2d 781,
786 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977); Travelers Indemn. Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 364 So. 2d 1041,
1042 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
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absentee, the parties, and the public in making joinder rulings in
most cases; but joinder decisions are explained in terms of the nar-
row and rigid classifications of articles 641 and 642 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, with their exclusive emphasis upon the interests of
the absentee. Insofar as Lamar described openly and frankly the
joinder factors considered by courts even before enactment of the
Code of Civil Procedure, Lamar's lack of impact on later cases can
be explained as a reflection of the fact that Louisiana's judiciary
always has considered a variety of interests in making joinder rul-
ings.
But if Lamar was intended to correct the unbalanced classifica-
tions of articles 641 and 642 by reinterpreting those articles, enabl-
ing the courts to refer to the federal criteria as a vehicle for honest
explanation of joinder decisions and to reflect that joinder is in-
herently a matter of balancing, the post-Lamar jurisprudence is
disappointing. The cases indicate that Lamar's influence is not suffi-
cient to overcome the narrow terminology of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure. Neither clarity, consistency, nor frankness is served by deci-
sions which cloak the pragmatic weighing process in terms of "direct
effect" and "separable" interests of absentees, to the exclusion of
clear and forthright consideration of the parties' and the courts' in-
terests in joinder questions. The decisions after Lamar show clearly,
if regrettably, that the supreme court's attempt to clarify Louisiana's
joinder law has failed. Apparently nothing short of statutory change,
replacing articles 641 and 642 with a provision closely tracking
revised Federal Rule 19, will persuade the judiciary to explain
joinder in such a way as to make comprehensible and rational this
area of Louisiana's procedural law.
Specialized Joinder Provisions: Thirteen Ways of Looking at a
Blackbird
The confusion in Louisiana joinder law created by the deceptive
terminology of articles 641 and 642 is compounded by the disjointed
fashion in which other provisions on compulsory joinder are scat-
tered throughout the Code of Civil Procedure. The general joinder
chapter is followed by chapters on "Parties Plaintiff" ' and on "Par-
ties Defendant" ' intended to consolidate prior rules contained in
the Civil Code, the Code of Practice, the Revised Statutes, and the
249. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 681-700.
250. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 731-43.
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jurisprudence."' These chapters denominate persons with sufficient
interest and capacity to sue or be sued and serve the same purpose
as 'Federal Rule 17, but attempt to specify precisely which persons
have sufficient authority to represent incompetents or entities such
as a partnership, a succession, or a labor union.
The chapter on "Parties Plaintiff' does not purport to establish
joinder rules. The fundamental principle of the chapter is stated in
article 681: "Except as otherwise provided by law, an action can be
brought only by a person having a real and actual interest which he
asserts."'' The remaining articles in the chapter either identify such
persons specificallyu or designate representatives for incompetents
or legal entities or associations.
However, articles 697 and 698, treating subrogation and assign-
ment, apparently create joinder rules: When an entire right is sub-
rogated or assigned, the subrogee or assignee is the proper person
to enforce the right. But partial subrogations and partial assign-
ments require joinder of both subrogor and subrogee, or assignor
and assignee, in a suit to enforce the claim. "5"
251. McMahon, The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, 21 LA. L. REv. 1, 28-29
(1960).
252. Rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states: "Every action shall
be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest."
253. Article 687 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a person who does
business under a trade name shall sue in his own name to enforce rights arising from
the business; article 688 specifies that a partnership has procedural capacity to enforce
its rights and appears through an authorized partner; article 689 grants procedural
capacity to unincorporated associations, which appear through an authorized officer;
articles 690 and 691 recognize that domestic and foreign corporations and insurers who
are not in receivership have capacity to sue in the corporate name.
254. Code of Civil Procedure article 683 designates the representatives of minors'
interests, while article 684 treats representatives of mental incompetents.
Article 685 designates the succession representative as the proper party to enforce
succession rights; article 686. as amended in 1979, provides that either spouse may sue
during the existence of the community to enforce a community right, but that the
other spouse is a "necessary party" whom the court may order joined if nonjoinder
could result in injustice to the absent spouse; article 692 designates the receiver or li-
quidator of a corporation or partnership as the proper party to enforce corporate or
partnership rights; article 693 makes the same provision as to a domestic insurer,
while providing that a Louisiana court-appointed ancillary receiver or liquidator is the
proper party to enforce rights of a nonresident insurer; article 699 designates the
trustee as the proper plaintiff to sue on behalf of an express trust. Article 700 creates
a presumption of authority in a designated representative, which may be challenged by
a dilatory exception.
255. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 697 provides that:
An incorporeal right to which a person has been subrogated, either conven-
tionally or by effect of law, shall be enforced judicially by:
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Most of the cases interpreting these articles address whether, in
the case of a total assignment or subrogation, the assignor or subro-
got retains sufficient interest to bring suit as a plaintiff and thus to
preserve his assignee's or subrogee's claim from extinction by pre-
scription." LaFleur v. National Health & Life Insurance Co.,U' pur-
portedly treated a total assignment of medical benefits on a health
policy to a hospital and an attending physician. The defendant in-
surer claimed that under article 698 the insured lacked a right of ac-
tion because the assignees were the proper plaintiffs or, alternative-
ly, that the assignees were indispensable parties.' The court found
that the plaintiff was a proper party by questioning whether the
assignment was, in effect, "entire enough" to deprive the insured of
all practical interest in the insurance proceeds." 9 Then, noting that
the purpose of the subrogation and assignment articles is to protect
defendants "against the harassment of multiple suits on the same
obligation,"' the court required a remand for joinder of the assign-
ees, whom it termed "indispensable." ' However, the court also con-
(1) The subrogor and the subrogee, when the subrogation is partial; or
(2) The subrogee, when the entire right is subrogated.
Article 698 makes substantially the same provision as to total and partial assignments.
256. Younger v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.. 193 So. 2d 798 (La.
App. 3d Cir.), writ refused. 250 La. 368, 195 So. 2d 644 (1967), held that a fully compen-
sated insured lacked interest in the subrogated claim of his insurer against a manufac-
turer for losses caused by a boiler explosion; the insured thus was not a proper plain-
tiff to sue on the claim. But Carl Heck Engineers, Inc. v. Daigle. 219 So. 2d 294 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1969) suggests that if the subrogor and subrogee by contract stipulate
that the subrogor will sue the debtor and hold in trust the recovery for the subrogee,
the subrogor properly may sue as agent of the subrogee. The decision is discussed in
Tate, supra note 25, at 293.
257. 185 So. 2d 838 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1966). The court considered the effect upon
the plaintiff of the trial court's dismissal of the suit: The assignment, though apparently
entire, might be proved by other evidence to have been only partial, in which case the
insured, to collect benefits due him, would have to file a later suit after the assignees
brought their claim; or later agreements between the insured and assignees could
change the assignment's effect, so that even a suit by the assignees would "be subject
to dismissal upon a similar technical defense." Since dismissal risked a multiplicity of
suits and prejudice to the plaintiff, and since the defendant's rights would be protected
adequately by a remand for joinder of the assignees, the court of appeal refused to
uphold the exception' of no right of action and reversed the dismissal of the action. Id.
258. Id. at 840.
259. Id. at 841-42.
260. Id. at 841 (quoting LA. CODE CIv. P. art 644, comment (c)).
261. Id. at 841. In Lafleur the appellate court balanced the interests of the plaintiff,
the defendant, and the judicial system and used the remand for joinder to preserve the
plaintiffs claim. The decision illustrates the weighing process needed to resolve which
parties belong in a single action and also indicates that the same factors which govern
joinder in the cases decided under the general joinder articles are decisive for articles
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sidered comment (d) to article 698, which states: "If the defendant
fails to object timely to the nonjoinder of a necessary party, in a
case of partial assignment, the objection is waived and the court
may make an adjudication." The comment indicates that while ar-
ticles 697 and 698 mandate joinder in cases involving partial subroga-
tions or assignments, the articles designate necessary, as opposed to
indispensable, parties. Certainly a court could shape its judgment to
insure that the claimant in a given case received only his share of
the debt owed by an obligor, though joinder analysis under articles
697 and 698 requires the same attention to particular facts and cir-
cumstances that are controlling in other joinder cases, and thus
whether articles 697 and 698 denominate necessary or indispensable
parties cannot be settled meaningfully in the abstract.
The chapter treating "Parties Defendant" requires joinder of the
specified representatives or entities: Persons lacking capacity to be
sued are represented by a tutor' or a curator' and, in the absence
of these, by a court-appointed attorney."
Substantially the same rules govern parties defendant as parties
697 and 698. The remand from the appellate level suggests that the joinder rules for
partial assignments or subrogations generally will have the same procedural impact as
the rules on indispensable parties, given the keen interest of obligors and absentees
with contractual rights in the litigation.
262. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 732.
263. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 733.
264. The need for representation of an unemancipated minor has been recognized
since Ashbey v. Ashbey, 41 La. Ann. 138. 5 So. 546 (1889), which noted that a tutor
whose interests are adverse to the minors' cannot represent them in suits on the con-
flicting interest. The proper circumstances for judicial appointment of an attorney to
represent a minor's interests were discussed in Redd v. Bohannon, 166 So. 2d 362 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1964), wherein an unemancipated minor stationed for military service in
Louisiana, with nonresident parents, was sued for damages to an automobile. Even
though the minor hired an attorney to represent him after suit was instituted, the
third circuit noted that the named defendant lacked procedural capacity: but the trial
court should have responded to the dilatory exception of lack of procedural capacity by
allowing the plaintiff to amend his petition to seek appointment of an attorney to
represent the minor, rather than by dismissing the action. However, the parent, tutor,
or attorney needed to protect the minor is not always treated as an indispensable party;
if a minor without procedural capacity is sued and an exception to his lack of capacity
is not raised before answer, the exception is waived, and the suit may proceed.
The Redd decision was cited in Davis v. Bankston, 192 So. 2d 614 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1966). as the basis for ruling that when a mother, apparently not qualified as tutrix,
sues on behalf of her child and when the defendant asserts a reconventional demand,
that demand cannot be made against the plaintiff unless an attorney is appointed by
the court to represent the minor. Id. at 619.
See also Nicosia v. Guillory, 322 So. 2d 129 (La. 1975).
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plaintiff.' The clarity of the provisions designating proper defen-
dants accounts for the paucity of recent jurisprudence interpreting
them. The recent amendment of article 735' and enactment of arti-
cle 743 "1 to correspond with the revision of the community property
laws may present interesting problems in identification of a "manag-
ing spouse" with respect to a particular community obligation; arti-
cle 735 also gives a trial court discretion to order on its own motion
the joinder of the absent spouse to a suit to enforce an obligation
against community property. The provision is puzzling-although
"either spouse" is the proper defendant to an action against com-
munity property, the other is a "necessary party"-and suggests
265. A succession representative is the proper defendant to an action against a suc-
cession under administration, and heirs and legatees need not be joined. LA. CODE CIV.
P. arts. 734, 926(6). The rule that the succession representative is the sole necessary
defendant in an action against a succession was established by Pauline v. Hubert, 14
La. Ann.. 161 (1859), a suit by a slave included in the succession inventory to establish
that she was freed. The supreme court reasoned that the heirs may not have accepted
the succession and that since the administrator represents both heirs and creditors, he
is able to protect the rights of all persons interested in the succession's effects. See
also, Veith v. Meyer, 166 La. 453, 117 So. 552 (1928).
A trustee is the proper defendant to any action enforcing an obligation against a
trust. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 742. Succession of Burgess, discussed in the text at notes
180-87, supra, suggests that if the trust's validity is attacked, the beneficiaries of the
trust income are indispensable.
Corporations and insurers, domestic and foreign, can be sued in the corporate name,
LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 739, unless they are in receivership or liquidation, in which case
the receiver is the proper representative of the defendant. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 740.
The provision also applies to partnerships.
Article 740 was intended to overrule legislatively Winn v. Veal-Winn Company'
Receiver, 16 La. App. 323, 134 So. 264 (2d Cir. 1931) by eliminating the rule that
judicial permission was required to sue a receiver. The Winn decision, however,
established an exception: A receiver who defends the suit without objection was deemed
to have waived the objection to lack of judicial consent. 16 La. App. at 826, 134 So. at
266. Accord, Anding v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 158 La. 412, 104 So. 190 (1925) which ap-
plied criteria similar to that of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c).
266. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 735, as amended in 1979. provides:
Either spouse js the proper defendant, during the existence of the marital com-
munity, In an :action to enforce an obligation against community property:
however, if one spouse is the managing spouse with respect to the obligation
sought to be enforced against the community property, then that spouse is the
proper defendant in an action to enforce the obligation....
When only one spouse is sued to enforce an obligation against community prop-
erty, the other spouse is a necessary party. Where the failure to join the other
spouse may result in an injustice to that spouse, the trial court may order the
joinder of that spouse on its own motion.
267. Code of Civil Procedure article 743 makes the other spouse the proper defen-
dant to a suit against community property if the managing spouse is an absentee or
mental incompetent.
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that, as one is proper and the other necessary, a plaintiff who wishes
to avoid delay in decision of a claim against community property
should join both spouses as a practical matter.
An unincorporated association, such as a church or labor union,
has procedural capacity to be sued in its own name under article
738 ,1U although the members may be sued jointly on an association
obligation.N
The rule that during the existence of a partnership suit must be
brought against the partnership, and not against individual mem-
bers, is firmly embedded in Louisiana jurisprudence" and codified
in article 737 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Some of the older cases
reflected confusion as to whether the individual partners could be
sued in solido with the partnership before its dissolution."' Later
decisions address whether a partnership is an "indispensable" party
in suits to enforce or defend partnership obligations.
A partnership was held indispensable to a reconventional de-
mand to cancel a lease executed by the partnership in Foster v.
268. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 738.
269. In Squaire v. Polk, 153 So. 504 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1934), a pastor was not
allowed to single out seventeen members of the congregation and to sue them for a
debt allegedly owed him. Under former LA. R.S. 13:3471 (1918), he should have sued
the association through service on a managing officer.
The rule was evaded in Douglas Public Serv. Corp. v. Gaspard, 225 La. 972. 74 So.
2d 182 (1954), a strike case in which the supreme court allowed suit against only a por-
tion of the union membership because the plaintiff did not name the union as a defen-
dant, but merely sued twenty-one striking individuals and then prayed for joinder of
all persons acting in concert with them. 225 La. at 979, 74 So. 2d at 184-85. Article 738
apparently ratifies this procedure, as well as upholding the ruling in Godchaux Sugars,
Inc. v. Chaisson, 227 La. 146, 78 So. 2d 673 (1955), that a union may be named and cited
through its officers.
270. Key v. Box, 14 La. Ann. 497 (1859). The rule was stated in article 165 of the
Code of Practice: the Key v. Box court created an exception to the general rule when a
Louisiana creditor attached property of a member of a foreign partnership, even
though the debt was a debt of a nonresident individual partner Id. at 497.
The general rule was upheld in E.B. Hayes Mach. Co. v. Eastham, 147 La. 347, 84
So. 898 (1920). which held that article 2892 of the Civil Code, holding partners solidarily
liable for the debts of a commercial partnership, did not apply to give a cause of action
against an individual partner until the partnership is dissolved. 147 La. at 352, 84 So.
at 900.
271. See, e.g., First Nat? Bank in Gibaland v. Knighton Bros., 16 La. App. 407, 134
So. 706 (2d Cir. 1931). which held that individual partners could be joined as solidary
obligors with their commercial partnership. But in Rheuark v. Terminal Mud & Chem.
Co., 213 La. 732, 35 So. 2d 592 (1948), the state supreme court held that the solidary
liability established by Civil Code article 2872 "does not become enforceable against
the individual members . . . separately and apart from the firm until it has been
dissolved." 213 La. at 737, 35 So. 2d at 594.
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Stewart;72 a partner sued to enjoin the partnership's lessor from
violating the lease terms. The original plaintiff did not answer the
defendant's reconventional demand, and the defendant took a de-
fault judgment against the partner for cancellation of the lease and
for $5,000 damages. The lessor claimed that the plaintiff's pro-
cedural error in instituting suit in his own name, instead of in the
name of the partnership, and his failure as defendant to the recon-
ventional demand to assert nonjoinder of the partnership should
estop his assertion of nonjoinder in challenging the default judg-
ment. 2 The first circuit, however, excused the partner's omissions
by finding the copies of the lease annexed to the original petition
sufficient notice to the defendant that the plaintiff had sued on
behalf of the partnership; pointing out that the lessor had failed to
object to nonjoinder of the partnership," the court shrugged off the
parties' mutual accusations of procedural default and focused on the
interest of the absent partnership in its lease. Finding the partner-
ship an indispensable party whose nonjoinder could be noticed on
appeal, the court set aside the trial court's denial of a new trial.275
Given the farcical scenario with which it was confronted, the first
circuit's exclusive focus upon the absentee's interests-and upon the
impact of the default judgment upon those interests-was probably
proper."'
However, it should be noted that the specific "rules" of the Code
of Civil Procedure designating particular plaintiffs and defendants
are keyed to a basically relational concept of interest. Though the
Code presumes a high degree of interest in the designated parties.
that interest should not invite reflex application of the specific ar-
ticles. Comment (c) to article 697 and comment (d) to article 698, in-
dicating that in cases of partial subrogation and assignment non-
joinder of a necessary party is waivable and that the plaintiff may
recover his share of the claim, is reminiscent of Federal Rule 19(b)'s
272. 161 So. 2d 334 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
273. I. at 336.
274. Id. at 336-37. The court remarked (patiently) that "[Alppellant's error in in-
stituting action in his own name was no more grievous than appellee's failure to except
to appellant's want of interest." Id. at 337.
275. Delta Motors is an indispensable party to these proceedings considering its
contractual rights ... would be so vitally affected by the outcome of this litigation
that complete and equitable adjudication of the present controversy cannot be
made unless the partnership is joined herein.
Id.
276. Once a partnership is dissolved, article 737 of the Code of Civil Procedure is
inapplicable. See, e.g., Cambre v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co, 331 So. 2d 585 (La.
App. 1st Cir.), writ refused, 334 So. 2d 434 (La. 1976).
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shaping of the judgment to avoid dismissal in the absence of a needed
party. The principle suggests that the Code of Civil Procedure con-
templates the modern federal remedy; and if that remedy is re-
quired in cases involving partial subrogations or assignments, its
practical benefit should be extended to all cases in which partial
relief might preserve a valid legal claim while protecting a defen-
dant from inconsistent obligations. The provision also serves as a
reminder that joinder involves concrete, practical considerations
which vary according to particular facts. Thus, even the tidiest rules
should bend in light of analysis of facts in specific cases in which the
principles underlying joinder should control conclusions as to whether
a party - partner, assignee, spouse - is indispensable or necessary or
proper in a given action.
The provisions discussed previously-the general joinder ar-
ticles and joinder of designated parties -address compulsory joinder
in the traditional sense-that is, whether a missing litigant is so
essential to adjudication of a suit that his presence is either neces-
sary or indispensable. In more limited situations, the Code of Civil
Procedure contemplates "compulsory" -joinder in a different sense:
allowing joinder so that the "absentee" can protect his own in-
terests, even though the parties before the court are not required to
join him. When property is seized by a judgment creditor and is
about to be sold at a judicial sale, article 1092 allows intervention by
a third person claiming ownership or a mortgage or privilege on the
property to assert his claim before the sale or disbursement of the
proceeds. " Although the language of article 1092 is permissive,
allowing intervention of right, timely intervention often is a prac-
tical necessity for preservation of the intervener's interests in seized
property.
If the third person claims ownership, he must intervene before
the sale, and the court may enjoin the sale pending decision of his
ownership claim; a although failure to intervene to assert ownership
277. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1092. See, e.g., Payne. Dameron & Co. v. Eaton &
Barstow, 27 La. Ann. 160 (1875).
Wagner v. Neunan, 18 La. Ann. 508, 511 (1865) established the rule that under arti-
cle 401 of the Code of Practice, a third opponent asserting a privilege could proceed
against the sheriff and seizing creditor without having first obtained a judgment
against the debtor and without requiring his joinder to the opposition. The rule was
changed by article 1093 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which requires joinder of all
parties to the principal action in the intervention.
278. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1092. The intervenor's petition is served on the sheriff
and on all parties to the judicial sale, and citation is not necessary. LA. CODE CIV. P.
art. 1093.
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does not give conclusive effect to the judicial sale and deprive the
actual owner of his property rights,' intervention will protect the
owner from the need to litigate in a later action a cloud on his title
or the adverse claims of purchasers. A third person claiming a mort-
gage or privilege must intervene before the sheriff distributes the
sale proceeds; the court can order the sheriff to hold the proceeds
pending resolution of ranking issues." And if intervention is made
before the sale, the court can order a separate appraisal or sale of
the property.'
If the claimant holds a superior mortgage or privilege on an im-
movable or a chattel mortgage recorded on the public records and
covering the entire property to be sold, intervention is not essential
to preserve his privilege: The property passes to the buyer encum-
bered with the superior privilege made effective by recordation.",
But intervention is advisable to facilitate the distribution of pro-
ceeds and to regulate the respective rights of the superior privilege
holder and the buyer, particularly if the mortgage or privilege has
matured and is in default.m An inferior lienholder should intervene
to enforce his claim against proceeds remaining after the seizing
creditor's judgment is satisfied. If the inferior lien covers only part
of the property to be sold in a "lump sale," it is imperative that in-
tervention be filed before the sale so that a court can order a sepa-
rate appraisal of the property to calculate the proportion of the pro-
ceeds attributable to the property covered by the lien.'"
In Caldwell v. Laurel Grove Co.'" an intervener who claimed a
prior privilege from an attachment of part of the debtor's property
was denied a preference because he did not intervene before the ju-
dicial sale under a writ of fieri facias in time to obtain a separate ap-
279. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2371. See also LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2298.
280. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1092.
281. Id.
282. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 2372, 2374.
283. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1092, comment (b).
284. An attempt to regulate the effect of a seizure and sale after disbursement has
been made is, obviously, wholly ineffectual. The supreme court apparently was shocked
by such a claim by an inferior privilege holder in Payne, Dameron, supra note 277,
commenting:
How the plaintiffs in this extraordinary proceeding expect 'to regulate the ef-
fect of a seizure in what relates to them' or their junior mortgage, eighteen
months after the seizure has been released, the sale consummated, and the funds
distributed, we can not imagine.
27 La. Ann. at 161.
285. 179 La. 53, 153 So. 17 (1934).
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praisal. The rationale for denying the preference bottomed upon
sheer practical necessity:
It has been the uniform jurisprudence of this court that an in-
tervener or opponent who claims or is entitled to a preference
on only part of the property under seizure must demand a sepa-
rate sale of such property or at least a separate appraisement ....
The reason is that without such separate sale or appraisement it
is impossible to determine the proportionate share of the pro-
ceeds to which such intervener is entitled.m
Although Caldwell was decided before enactment of the Code of
Civil Procedure, the practical need for separate appraisal to enforce
a privilege on part of seized property remains unchanged. The lien-
holder must join in the judicial sale by timely intervention, and the
sanction for failure to do so is loss of the privilege on the property.
Likewise, an inferior privilege on movables is lost after a judicial
sale unless the privilege-holder joins the sale before distribution of
the proceeds;' if the privilege covers only part of the property, in-
tervention must precede the sale to be effective. Article 1092 allows
joinder of a judicial sale without prejudicing the claimant's right to
attack the validity of the seizing creditor's claim and thus overrules
legislatively early decisions imposing an inefficient estoppel princi-
ple whose sole effect was to require two suits when one could have
served to vindicate both claims of the intervener.""
286. 179 La. at 55, 153 So. at 18.
287. LA. CODE Cv. P. art. 1092.
288. In Albert Pick & Co. v. Stringer, 171 La. 131, 129 So. 731 (1930), an intervenor
with chattel mortgages on movables in a building about to be sold sought a temporary
restraining order against seizure and sale of the real estate and movables. The in-
tervenor acquired his mortgage after executory process issued. The supreme court
held that "an opposition will not lie where the opponent attacks the validity of the
judgment or mortgage and in the same action claims to be paid by preference out of
the proceeds realized from the sale of the property." 171 La. at 141, 129 So. at 735.
That rule was applied in Eddy v. Weathers, 16 La. App. 634, 134 So. 259 (Orl. Cir.
1931), wherein a mortgage-creditor sued a defendant on a note which was secured by
real estate, livestock, and trucks. An intervenor claiming a vendor's privilege on cattle
intervened before the sale to attack the validity of the creditor's mortgage and to
claim a preference on the sale proceeds. The court refused to let the intervenor attack
the mortgage by intervention before the sale "because the intervenor went into that
proceeding and acquiesced in the sale under the act of mortgage, merely claiming that
he was entitled to the proceeds by priority over the mortgage creditor." 16 La. App.
at 636, 134 So. at 260.
Although the court's reasoning in these cases may have a technical consistency, no
practical reason exists for insisting that the lienholder institute a separate suit before
intervention to attack the creditor's mortgage. Even if the sale were stayed pending
resolution of the validity attack, common sense and judicial efficiency support article
1092's elimination of a rule which produces only duplicative litigation and delay.
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Occasionally, the requirement that a lienholder intervene to pro-
tect his security clashes with jurisdictional amount limitations on
subject matter jurisdiction in courts of limited jurisdiction. In Sam--
Baker Corp. v. Magendie" a plaintiff sued in city court and seized
under fieri facias an automobile; another party claimed ownership of
the vehicle and sought mandamus in the district court to compel the
city court to enjoin execution of the creditor's judgment. The dis-
trict court denied the injunction because the value of the automobile
exceeded the $300 jurisdictional amount limitation on the city court.
The Louisiana Supreme Court held that "when the value of the prop-
erty seized under a writ from a court of limited jurisdiction, is
beyond the jurisdiction of that court, an injunction may be obtained
by one claiming its ownership from a court having jurisdiction of the
amount involved." m The court in dicta also announced that when a
plaintiff is prevented by the amount of his claim from litigating his
rank and privilege vis-d-vie other creditors in a court of limited
jurisdiction, the intervener may "compel his adversary to come into
a higher court to litigate their claims.""'
Joinder by intervention required by article 1092 is mandated by
practical needs to regulate the effects of a judicial sale; even when
intervention is not essential to preservation of a claimant's interest,
a single proceeding is the most efficient way to effectuate the in-
terests of the seizing creditor, other lienholders or persons claiming
ownership, and the buyer of property sold. Because joinder under
article 1092 is intended to protect the interests of the third person,
he must initiate intervention, and it is he, and not the other parties,
who bears the onus of failure to join his claim timely.
Article 1092 creates intervention of right in limited cir-
cumstances; whether intervention of right is otherwise available in
Louisiana's procedural system is an open question. The criteria for
permissive intervention in Louisiana are purportedly established in
article 1091 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which states, "A third
person having an interest therein may intervene in a pending action
to enforce a right related to or connected with the object of the pend-
ing action against one or more of the parties thereto ... ." The arti-
cle, however, does not define what degree of relation or connection
is sufficient to justify intervention. Comment (b) to article 1091
states categorically that Federal Rule 24's concepts of "intervention
of right" and 'permissive intervention" "are not suitable for imple-
menting the substantive law of a-civil law jurisdiction," presumably
289. 157 La. 643, 102 So. 821 (1925).
290. 157 La. at 645, 102 So. at 822.
291. Id.
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because "the test of 'a question of law or fact in common' of the
federal permissive intervention is much too narrow and inflexible to
define the traditional function of intervention in the procedure of
civilian jurisdictions." 2 The reporter's comments do not explain
why civilian substantive law and federal intervention are incompati-
ble. It is difficult to believe that the intervention permitted by arti-
cle 1091 is really broader and more flexible than federal interven-
tion," '8 given the restrictive traditional Louisiana test:
[T]he interest required to authorize intervention must be a
direct one by which the intervenor is to obtain immediate gain
or suffer immediate loss by the judgment which may be rendered
between the original parties. The interest must be closely con-
nected with 'the object in dispute and founded on some right,
lien, or claim, either conventional or legal."'
The restrictive application of article 1091 is illustrated in Resor
v. Mouton,"5 which refused to allow a building owner to intervene in
a tort suit between two drivers who had injured his property on the
grounds that the would-be intervener "had no interest in the main
demand and therefore had no right to intervene."' Since the "ob-
ject" of the building owner's attempted intervention was "to recover
his own damages," he did not "seek to enforce a right related to or
connected" with the parties' liability claims against one another,2"
although the fourth circuit indicated that consolidation of a separate
suit by the intervener with the original suit might be proper to
avoid a multiplicity of actions." That suggestion indicates that the
consolidation standard of "involving a common issue of law or fact"
outlined in article 1561 is broader than the intervention standard of
connexity, despite the claim of 1091's comments that Louisiana in-
tervention is broader than the federal model. The close factual rela-
tionship between the intervener's claim and the parties' tort is ob-
vious in Resor, and the decision can only-be read to mean that even
permissive intervention is often unavailable in Louisiana, as more
292. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1091, comment (b).
293. FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
294. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm n, 241 La. 687, 698,
130 So. 2d 652, 656-57 (1961) (emphasis added). The test apparently does not encompass
even permissive intervention based on common issues of law or fact, even if interven-
tion is timely and would not disrupt proceedings between the original parties.
295. 200 So. 2d 308 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
296. Id. at 309.
297. Id. at 310.
298. Id.
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than a factual link between the intervener's claim and the object of
the main suit is required.
The imprecision and "double talk" of Louisiana's intervention
standard is highlighted in a subsequent statement by the reporter
responsible for the comments to article 1091:
Obviously in Louisiana, such a rule [allowing intervention] must
be broader than either the "community of interest" required for
the cumulation of actions by or against plural parties, or the "in-
terests affected by the judgment" which determines necessary
or indispensable parties. Yet, to prevent interference with the
administration of justice by intermeddlers and rank interlopers,
the privilege of intervening must be restricted to those who
have some action.'
It does not make sense to say that intervention in Louisiana is
"broader" than the community of interest required for cumulation of
parties, which does not require a juridical connexity among
parties,sm and then to posit as a requirement for intervention "some
juridical interest." If the statement means anything, it means that
the standards for intervention under article 1091 are indefinite and
defy rational definition. Given the uncertainty of statutory stan-
dards in the Code of Civil Procedure, statements which claim that
Louisiana does not need federal intervention of right are suspect,
particularly when no reason is given for denial of that useful pro-
cedural device.
Moreover, Louisiana may have intervention of right already, at
least obliquely, even in cases beyond the scope of article 1092. An in-
teresting joinder decision by the First Circuit Court of Appeal is
Gulf Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Sehrt,"' which uses "in-
dispensable party" terminology to create a device like intervention
of right. The plaintiff brought an action for declaratory judgment
that a state statute authorizing the State Banking Commissioner to
approve state bank branches was unconstitutional. The state bank
grantees attempted timely to intervene, but the trial court dismissed
their claims. Remanding on other issues, the first circuit stated that
"each of these intervenors had already received approvals from the
Commissioner and several had commenced operations thereunder.
Their interventions should not have been dismissed because they
299. McMahon, Civil Procedure: The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1960-1961 Term, 22 La. L. Rev. 370, 371 (1962). (emphasis added).
300. See, e.g., Gill v. City of Lake Charles, 119 La. 17, 43 So. 897 (1907).
301. 233 So. 2d 268 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
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are indispensable parties, who possess rights that are now sought to
be materially affected. '"' Given the keen interest of the state banks
in the litigation and the diligence with which they asserted thpir
claims, the appellate court's ruling is reasonable and fair. The lack
of an explicit device for intervention of right in Louisiana can be
supplied by finding an intervener "indispensable" or "necessary." If
a party's interests in an action and his relation to it are such that he
would be indispensable under the Lamar multi-factored joinder test,
a court should have required his joinder and can at least be respon-
sive enough to his interests to permit him to protect them; and if a
person would be necessary under the tests of Federal Rule 19(a) that
Lamar extends to article 632, his intervention also should be allowed
of right,"' as he is a party who "should be joined if feasible" for full
adjudication.
The close parallels in the federal system between Rule 19(a) cri-
teria and the criteria established by Federal Rule 24(a) for interven-
tion of right$ suggest that compulsory joinder is an appropriate
vehicle for filling this gap in the Louisiana procedural scheme; as in-
dicated in Sehrt, a finding that a person has enough interest to re-
quire his joinder has the same effect as allowing intervention of
right and serves both fairness and judicial efficiency.
The conditions under which addition of claims5 or parties to a
suit is permitted in Louisiana is covered by the chapter of the Code
of Civil Procedure dealing with "Cumulation of Actions." Article 463
provides that a party may add litigants to a pending suit if:
(1) There is a community of interest between the parties joined;
(2) Each of the actions cumulated is within the jurisdiction of
the court and is brought in the proper venue; and
(3) All of the actions cumulated are mutually consistent and
employ the same form of procedure.
302. Id. at 271.
303. No jurisdictional problems can arise in a state court proceeding when the
court has general jurisdiction and when the party asks to join a pending action.
304. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) states in pertinent part that:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: ...
(2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the
action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that in-
terest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing par-
ties.
This language is substantially similar to la'iguage addressing the absentee's interest in
Rule 19(a) and is compatible with LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 641.
305. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 462.
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In most instances, joinder by a defendant of a third person who may
be liable for all or part of the plaintiff's claim is permissive'" and is
governed by the general rules on cumulation,3 with the exception
that a third party defendant properly impleaded cannot object to
venue if it is proper in the main demand.'" The sole exception to the
general rule is article 1113, which compels a defendant to join the
third person if joinder is necessary to preserve the third person's
defenses:
A defendant who does not bring in as a third party defendant a
person who is liable to him for all or part of the principal de-
mand does not on that account lose his right or cause of action
against such person, unless the latter proves that he had means
of defeating the action which were not used, because the defen-
dant either failed to bring him in as a third party defendant, or
neglected to apprise him that the suit had been brought. The
same rule obtains with respect to a defendant in reconvention
who fails to bring in as a third party defendant a person who is
liable to him for all or part of the reconventional demand.
The compulsory joinder requirement of article 1113 is unusual; it
has no immediate procedural impact upon the main action between
the plaintiff and defendant, and the person who should have been
joined must establish in a later action that the original defendant's
failure to join has prejudiced the third party's defenses. To do so
the omitted person must prove that he had defenses to the plain-
tiffs claim which were not used and that the defendant not only did
not join the third party, but also did not inform him of the suit so
that he could intervene to protect his own interests.19
In Trinity Universal Insurance Co. v. Good' a surety sued to
recover from the defendants under an indemnity contract; the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal held that the defendants could not
defeat the surety's claim by complaining of his failure to join them
in the prior action against the surety, for which indemnification now
was claimed, because the defendants were notified of the suit six
weeks before judgment and therefore had ample time in which to in-
806. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1111.
307. LA. CODE CIrv. P. art. 1037. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Sonnier. 344 So. 2d 73
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
808. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1034.
309. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1113.
310. 202 So. 2d 379 (La. App. 4th Cir.), u-it refued, 251 La. 396, 204 So. 2d 675
(1967).
1981]
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tervene. The defendants also failed to prove that they could have
defeated the action against the surety.'
The nonjoined absentee has the burden of proof to show that he
should have been a third party defendant in an earlier action, be-
cause joinder under article 1113 is designed to protect solely the in-
terests of the absentee; the plaintiff with a valid claim against a
defendant need not concern himself with joining a person who may
owe the defendant a portion of the plaintiff's claim. The defendant,
who could protect himself by joining the absentee, is not required to
do so in order to protect his own interests; he can institute a later
suit to enforce his claims against the absentee."" But if joinder
would protect the absentee, the defendant must join the third party
if he can prove prejudice from nonjoinder.
Moreover, the "mandatory" joinder of the absentee to protect
his defenses will not be allowed when the third party demand would
disrupt orderly disposition of the main suit. In Commercial National
311. 202 So. 2d at 384. In Futch v. Nolden, 221 So. 2d 351 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969),
a suit to recover from a solidary co-obligor the payments the plaintiff made to settle a
prior suit, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff had abandoned his claim by failing
to join the defendant to the suit. The fourth circuit hoted that article 1113 "makes it
clear that a litigant does not lose his cause or right of action by failing to bring a third-
party action against a party who may be liable to him, unless that party can prove he
had the means of defeating the action at the time the principal demand was made." Id.
at 352.
312. The limited recovery against a third party defendant granted by article 1111
encourages the defendant not to bring the third party demand if he also has non-
indemnification claims to press against the absentee. As written, the article allows the
defendant to recover only all or part of the amount owed to the plaintiff. And Loui-
siana does not have an article permitting cross claim.
Beneficial Fin. -Co. of New Orleans v. Bienemy, 244 So. 2d 275 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1971) upheld a restrictive interpretation of article 1111, ruling that a defendant can seek
only reimbursement and not his own damages by way of a third party demand.
However, in Travelers Ins. Co. v. Sonnier, 344 So. 2d 73 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977) the
fourth circuit expressly overruled Bienemy and reasoned that if a defendant properly
impleads a third party, the question of which claims can be pressed against the third
party is to be governed by the cumulation articles.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has not ruled expressly on whether a defendant may
assert his own damage claims, in addition to an indemnification claim, against a third
party defendant when the claims are closely related. However, its holding in Avegno
v. Byrd, 377 So. 2d 268 (La. 1979), that objection to the use of a third party demand to
assert a defendant's claims for his own damages against a third party defendant was
untimely if not made before the case is submitted for decision hints that the supreme
court may approve combination of an article 1111 third party demand with cumulation
under article 462 to create a cross claim, a procedure which would serve the interests
of both the parties and the judiciary in economy.
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Bank of Shreveport v. Calk8 8 a contractor sought to defend a bank's
suit on a negotiable instrument by joining a machinery dealer who
sold the defendant allegedly defective equipment; the trial court
refused to allow joinder of the dealer because he could not be lo-
cated, and a continuance would delay the bank's suit. The court of
appeal affirmed and "out of an abundance of precaution" expressly
reserved the defendant's right to proceed later against the dealer.
The court's balancing of the absentee's possible interests in joinder
against the interests of the parties and of the court in efficient
dispatch of the claim suggests that the traditional factors influenc-
ing joinder are pertinent even to this specialized form of joinder
which stresses the interests of the nonjoined person.
A claim that the limited joinder requirements of article 1113 of
the procedural code are supplemented by a requirement in article
2103 of the Civil Code that might require joinder whenever con-
tribution rights among solidary obligors arise was treated in
Thomas v. W & W Clarklift, Inc."1 ' and rejected by the state
supreme court. The case involved an employee's suit against the
seller of a used forklift and its insurer for injuries the employee sus-
tained on his employer's premises. The defendant made a third party
demand against the employer's supervisory personnel for negligence
and sought contribution. The trial court dismissed the third party
demands; at issue was whether the defendant's contribution claim
had prescribed. The supreme court cited article 2103 of the Civil
Code"" as allowing assertion of a contribution claim by a defendant
through a third party demand, but noted that the provision does not
require assertion of the contribution claim in the main action." ' The
court reasoned that a defendant's right to contribution does not
arise until the plaintiff gets a judgment against the defendant, so
prescription cannot begin to run until the defendant is cast as a tort-
feasor. The court's use of article 1113 of the Code of Civil Procedure
to support its holding on the prescription issue did not discuss the
aspects of the procedural article designed to protect the absentee,
and the decision does not mean that joinder in the main action
would not have been required had the third party defendant shown
prejudice from nonjoinder or lack of notice of the main action. The
relationship of article 2103 of the Civil Code to article 1113 of the
313. 207 So. 2d 578 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
314. 375 So. 2d 376 (La. 1979).
315. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2103.
316. 375 So. 2d at 378. The court cited article 1113 as authority for the defendant's
right to bring a later action against the employer's personnel.
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Code of Civil Procedure also was considered in Emmons v. Agricul-
tural Insurance Co.17 The defendant and his insurer did not bring a
third party demand in the trial court against allegedly solidary co-
tortfeasors; at issue on appeal was whether the defendant could ap-
peal against the co-defendant without third party demand on the
trial level. In creating a third party demand at the appellate level
for solidary obligors, the supreme court relied in part upon article
2068 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 8' s but stressed too the discre-
tionary, permissive aspect of article 2103 of the Civil Code'and
noted that "[tjhere is no penaliy" for failure to seek contribution
through a third party demand. Emmons and Thomas indicate that
Civil Code article 2103 will not be engrafted upon the procedural
code to mandate joinder for all contribution claims among solidary
obligors and that article 1113 will remain a device available to com-
pel joinder only in limited factual situations.
The protection afforded an absentee under article 1113 requires
joinder only when failure to join would frustrate the absentee's
defense. Even when joinder is required solely to protect the absen-
tee, the Commercial Bank decision shows that the absentee's inter-
ests still must be balanced against the interests of the present par-
ties and of the court in convenience and efficiency before joinder is
in fact mandatory.
Concluding Unscientific Postscript
Review of Louisiana jurisprudence and legislation on compulsory
joinder reveals no interests peculiar to Louisiana's legal system
which are not within the general scope of joinder goals in all pro-
cedural systems: fairness to the absentee, the litigants, and the
court. What is revealed, however, is that the statutes intended to
provide criteria for resolving joinder issues in Louisiana are at once
vague and narrow, keyed exclusively to the outdated and lopsided
test of the absentee's interests. The effort by the Louisiana Su-
preme Court in Lamar to correct the defects of the Code of Civil
Procedure's general joinder articles has been largely ignored by sub-
sequent cases, so that the inconsistency, reflex decisions, and
317. 245 La. 411, 158 So. 2d 594 (1963).
318. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2086 provides: "A person who could have intervened in
the trial court may appeal, whether or not any other appeal has been taken." The Em.
mons court noted that the "right [of appeal] is extended not only to the parties to the
suit ... but also to a third party when such third party is allegedly aggrieved by the
judgment." 245 La. at 425, 158 So. 2d at 599.
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obscurity of joinder rulings condemned by the supreme court con-
tinues unabated.
The confusion created by rigid and impractical formulas in ar-
ticles 641 and 642 is compounded by the Code of Civil Procedure's
"shotgun" approach to other specific joinder questions, treating
them in scattered provisions which suggest rigid, isolated rules
which also fail to state the varied interests joinder addresses. The
pragmatic concerns which prompted formulation of joinder prin-
ciples in the first place have become replaced with incomplete for-
mulas which overlook facts by substituting labels. Since judicial
reformulation of principles has been, regrettably, unsuccessful, it
seems that only legislative reformulation can resolve rationally and
practically Louisiana's joinder dilemma.
Articles 641 and 642 should be replaced with a provision pat-
terned closely upon Federal Rule 19, stating clearly the factors
courts must consider in deciding joinder questions. Jurisprudence
based upon the present Code articles must be recognized as having
little precedential value-not only because the cases are too often
scanty in offering reasons for their rulings, but also because the
very nature of joinder mandates that the facts of particular cases
control. And insofar as specific joinder rules such as articles 697,
698, 1092, and 1113 are retained, they should be modified to incor-
porate at least by reference the flexible criteria of the federal rule.
Nothing short of a clear understanding by both bench and bar that
joinder is a practical and not a doctrinaire device can ensure ra-
tional joinder decisions in particular suits. Joinder should be used
only to promote the principles that spawned it. And a legislative
mandate should command the attention of the courts and their of-
ficers, sparking careful evaluation of the diverse interests to be ad-
dressed functionally when an interested party is omitted from a
suit.
Kelly Mangum*
J.D. conferred May, 1981, Louisiana State University.
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